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“To their supporters, whistleblowers are nothing short
of heroes who risk their lives or careers for the public
good. On the other hand, critics view whistleblowers as
1
‘snitches,’ ‘stool pigeons,’ or ‘industrial spies’ . . . .”
I.

INTRODUCTION

“Good cop, bad cop” is an interrogation or negotiation
strategy whereby one person is antagonistic and overtly
unsympathetic and his or her colleague is excessively friendly and
2
supportive. While the “good cop, bad cop” routine is usually
performed by two or more parties, in-house counsel often have to
carry out both functions, “good cop” and “bad cop,” in their
3
relationship with their companies. The in-house counsel “good
cop” seeks to please the organizational actors, coordinates with its
business purpose, and works to meet operational needs from the
legal perspective. In-house counsel act as the “good cop” in their
1. Lois A. Lofgren, Whistleblower Protection: Should Legislatures and the Courts
Provide a Shelter to Public and Private Sector Employees Who Disclose the Wrongdoing of
Employers?, 38 S.D. L. REV. 316, 316 (1993) (citation omitted) (examining
whistleblower law in South Dakota).
2. See David Bosworth, United States v. Patane: The Supreme Court’s Continued
Assault on Miranda, 56 MERCER L. REV. 1499, 1501 n.14 (2005) (interrogation
tactic); Alain Burrese, Strategy vs. Tactics, MONT. LAW., Feb. 2007, at 26, 26, available
at
http://www.montanabar.org/associations/7121/feb2007screen.pdf
(negotiation tactic).
3. For purposes of this article, “in-house counsel” refers to any attorney who
is an employee of a company or organization (other than a law firm)—including
attorneys in law departments or in any business lines—and the company or
organization (or any segment thereof) is said attorney’s sole client. For a
definition of “outside attorney” or “outside counsel,” see infra Part III.A
(comparing the roles of in-house counsel and outside attorneys) and infra note 83
(defining outside attorney).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss4/4

2

Banick: Case Note: The "In-house" Whistleblower: Walking the Line Between

1870

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
4

[Vol. 37:4

5

roles as: gatekeeper; zealous advocate; business executive and
6
7
strategist; and confidential counselor. Conversely, the in-house
counsel “bad cop” seeks to limit organizational and employee
misconduct, maintain legal compliance, and, arguably, uphold
ethical standards. In-house counsel act as the “bad cop” in their
8
9
roles as: nonparticipant in illegal activity; compliance facilitator;
10
and potential whistleblower.

4. Lawrence A. Cunningham, Beyond Liability: Rewarding Effective Gatekeepers,
92 MINN. L. REV. 323, 328 (2007) (“Gatekeepers include auditors and attorneys,
who work directly with and essentially inside the enterprise.”); Ronald J. Gilson,
The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective, 49 MD. L. REV. 869,
883 (1990) (“[In a] well-functioning gatekeeper regime . . . . [w]rongdoing is
prevented, rather than punished after the fact . . . .”).
5. See MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (2008) (describing the lawyer’s
role as “zealous advocate”); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (2007) (“As
advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client’s position under the rules of the
adversary system.”). The obligation of zealous representation applies not only in
the litigation context, but also when an attorney is advising or counseling a client
in any legal matter. MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING
LAWYERS’ ETHICS 69 (4th ed. 2010) (“[I]t is not just the client currently in litigation
who may both require and be entitled to ‘warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his rights.’”).
6. See Nandu Machiraju, When Hot Docs Set Your Company on Fire: Expanding
the Role of the General Counsel to Manage Antitrust Risk, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 997,
1004–07 (2009) (asserting that a general counsel’s role should not be limited to
legal advice; arguing that a general counsel should have some duties similar to
“other functional chief executives,” including increased involvement in strategic
decision-making).
7. Robert J. Jossen, Dealing with the Lawyer’s Responsibilities Under the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002: Ethical Dilemmas and Practical Considerations, in A.L.I.-A.B.A.
COURSE OF STUDY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 667, 687
(2003) (“Lawyers play a crucial role in contributing to corporate compliance as
confidential counselors.”); see MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2007)
(stating that “[a] lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation
of a client,” except in limited prescribed circumstances); MINN. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2008) (stating that, except under expressly stated
circumstances, “a lawyer shall not knowingly reveal information relating to the
representation of a client”).
8. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2007) (“A lawyer shall not
counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is
criminal or fraudulent . . . .”); accord MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d)
(2008).
9. Sarah Helene Duggin, The Pivotal Role of the General Counsel in Promoting
Corporate Integrity and Professional Responsibility, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 989, 1012 (2007)
(“[T]he general counsel and other in-house lawyers play a major role in ensuring
legal compliance throughout the entity.”).
10. See Deborah L. Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A Functional Perspective on
Professional Codes, 59 TEX. L. REV. 689, 711 (1981) (discussing the “lawyer’s role as
whistleblower”).
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It is this dual nature that makes the job of the in-house counsel
so complex. It is also this dual nature that makes attorneywhistleblower lawsuits, and the underlying public policy interests,
difficult to resolve. Whistleblower claims by in-house counsel
implicate legal doctrines of employment law and ethical obligations
of client confidentiality, as well as practical and moral constraints
that attorneys encounter in their decision-making process.
This article begins by describing the policy rationales and
11
sources of whistleblower law. It continues with an explanation of
the unique issues faced by in-house counsel and discusses Kidwell v.
12
Sybaritic, Inc., which involved an in-house attorney’s claim for
13
whistleblower protection. Next, it analyzes and debates the two
main issues raised by Kidwell: the job duty exception from
whistleblower protection and the client confidentiality rule for
14
attorney-whistleblowers. This article concludes that the job duty
exception is an inappropriate mechanism for determining
whistleblower cases and that a breach of confidentiality should not
necessarily preclude attorneys from recovering on otherwise
15
meritorious whistleblower claims.
Moreover, this article
recognizes the validity of whistleblower claims by in-house counsel
and recommends a balancing test for determining good faith—an
issue which, due to its role in the analysis, can alter the way
16
whistleblower cases are decided.
II. THE LAW AND POLICY OF WHISTLEBLOWER STATUTES
A. Defining “Whistleblowers”
In order to appropriately discuss “whistleblowers” and the acts
for which they are named (i.e., “whistleblowing”), it is necessary to
define the term. An expansive understanding may designate as a
whistleblower any employee who “opposes” the conduct, actions, or
17
decisions of his or her employer. Such a broad explanation is
11. See infra Part II.
12. 784 N.W.2d 220 (Minn. 2010).
13. See infra Part III.
14. See infra Parts IV, V.
15. See infra Parts IV, V, VII.
16. See infra Parts VI, VII.
17. Jonathan W.J. Armour, Who’s Afraid of the Big, Bad, Whistle?: Minnesota’s
Recent Trend Toward Limiting Employer Liability Under the Whistleblower Statute, 19
HAMLINE L. REV. 107, 109 n.13 (1995) (citing DANIEL P. WESTMAN,
WHISTLEBLOWING: THE LAW OF RETALIATORY DISCHARGE 19 (1991)) (“In its broadest
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inadequate for the purposes of this article because it fails to
provide any useful guidance. A narrow characterization may result
in something akin to one commentator’s detailed description:
“someone who, believing that the public interest overrides the
interest of the organization he [or she] serves, publicly ‘blows the
whistle’ if the organization is involved in corrupt, illegal,
18
fraudulent, or harmful activity.”
Such a specific depiction of
whistleblowers is too limited for the purposes of this article.
There exists no single, widely recognized—much less
19
universally accepted—definition of whistleblowing.
However, a
clear and accurate definition would address four main elements: 1)
to whom or to what entity a disclosure or whistleblowing report
20
may be made; 2) the nature of the “wrongs” that can be reported
sense, whistleblowing includes employees who oppose their employer's conduct
either externally or internally.”). The word “oppose” is so open and ambiguous in
this context that it could arguably include employees who simply express
discontent to their co-workers or any other person regarding their employer—or,
even employees who internally disagree with their employers but never show any
objective manifestation of their dissent.
18. Lofgren, supra note 1, at 316 (quoting RALPH NADER ET AL.,
WHISTLEBLOWING: THE REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY VII (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted)). This description
of a whistleblower is too restrictive because only a few employees would necessarily
satisfy the first two elements of the definition: 1) that the employee’s underlying
rationale is that the “public interest” overrides or trumps the organization’s
interest; and 2) that the employee must “blow the whistle” publicly. These
elements preclude purported whistleblowers that either: 1) fail to rationalize their
actions in terms of the importance of the “public interest” and base their decisions
on some other standard of conduct (e.g., ethical duties, moral reasoning); or 2)
fail to make a “public” pronouncement of their employer’s wrongdoing.
19. See Kevin Rubinstein, Internal Whistleblowing and Sarbanes-Oxley Section 806:
Balancing the Interests of Employee and Employer, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 637, 640
(2007) (“[T]here is no single definition of whistleblowing . . . .”).
20. There are three main classifications of parties who may receive a report:
1) internal parties (within the same organization); 2) all external parties (e.g., all
governmental actors, the media); and/or 3) purely governmental actors with
authority to investigate, impose sanctions, or otherwise correct the “wrong.” See,
e.g., Armour, supra note 17, at 109 (employer or appropriate governmental
agency); Frank J. Cavico, Private Sector Whistleblowing and the Employment-At-Will
Doctrine: A Comparative Legal, Ethical, and Pragmatic Analysis, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 543,
548 (2004) (“higher-ups” within the company, government regulatory agency,
public interest organization, or the media); John A. Gray, The Scope of Whistleblower
Protection in the State of Maryland: A Comprehensive Statute Is Needed, 33 U. BALT. L.
REV. 225, 227–28 (2004) (employer, the press, or enforcement authorities);
Anthony Heyes & Sandeep Kapur, An Economic Model of Whistle-Blower Policy, 25 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 157, 159–60 (2009) (appropriate regulatory agency); Jisoo Kim,
Confessions of a Whistleblower: The Need to Reform the Whistleblower Provision of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 241, 241 n.1 (2009) (appropriate
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21

and qualify as whistleblowing; 3) the degree to which the
22
whistleblower needs knowledge or evidence of the “wrongs”; and
23
4) the whistleblower’s intent or purpose in making a report. For
the purposes of this article, the following definition will be utilized
to describe whistleblowers: employees who, in good faith and with a
reasonable belief that their assertions are accurate, report, disclose,
or otherwise make known to parties internal or external to the
organization any violation of law by their employers (or entities or
persons under the employers’ management and control) for the
24
purpose of exposing such wrongdoing.

governmental agency).
21. The nature, or type, of “wrong” can vary greatly from vague and subjective
standards such as conduct “injurious to the public” or “immoral[] or illegitimate
practices” to clearer, more concrete criteria such as violations of law. See, e.g.,
Armour, supra note 17, at 109 (“violation of law”); Gray, supra note 20, at 227
(“injurious to the public”); Terry Morehead Dworkin, SOX and Whistleblowing, 105
MICH. L. REV. 1757, 1760 (2007) (“illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices”).
22. The determination or extent of the purported whistleblower’s requisite
knowledge may vary from a certain level of subjective belief to actual evidence
sufficient to convince a reasonable person. See, e.g., Cavico, supra note 20, at 566
(good faith, potentially including “absence of malice” and “honesty of intention”);
Heyes & Kapur, supra note 20, at 159 (“evidence that would convince a reasonable
person”); Rubinstein, supra note 19, at 643 (“reasonable belief”).
23. Intent or purpose may be characterized, if at all, in an infinite number of
ways. Some formulations used to describe a whistleblower’s intent or purpose
include the following: “motivated by notions of public interest”; “to prevent harm
to others”; or “intention of making information public.” See, e.g., ROBERTA ANN
JOHNSON, WHISTLEBLOWING: WHEN IT WORKS—AND WHY 3 (2003) (“intention of
making information public”); Heyes & Kapur, supra note 20, at 159 (“to prevent
harm to others”); Kim, supra note 20, at 241 n.1 (“motivated by notions of public
interest”).
24. There are several features of this definition that are particularly
noteworthy. First, it requires that alleged whistleblowers act in good faith from a
subjective point of view and that they have an objectively reasonable belief that the
underlying allegation is true. Next, an employee may “blow the whistle” to parties
inside his or her own organization or any public entity (e.g., government actors or
the media). Also, the wrongdoing being disclosed or made known must be a
violation of law—a standard which is, for the most part, objectively identifiable and
not subject to the whims or morality of individual employees. Finally, the
“purpose” of exposing wrongdoing simply means that the ultimate goal or
outcome is to make the wrongdoing known to some other party—the underlying
personal reason or subjective intent for “blowing the whistle” is irrelevant. This
definition is widely applicable and generally describes any bona fide whistleblower
(attorney or non-attorney). However, there may be additional requirements or
constraints on an in-house counsel in order to receive whistleblower protection,
which effectively make the definition of an in-house counsel-whistleblower slightly
narrower than the general definition employed here. See infra Part VI.D.2.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss4/4

6

Banick: Case Note: The "In-house" Whistleblower: Walking the Line Between

1874

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:4

This characterization is sufficiently descriptive to exclude
purported “whistleblowers” that are actually just dissenters not
taking any real action and still adequately comprehensive to
25
include all of the main groups, or “types,” of whistleblowers.
B. Why Protect Whistleblowers?
Commentators have hypothesized and asserted numerous
policy reasons for the establishment and perpetuation of
whistleblower protections. In order to fully comprehend the
import of whistleblower statutes, it is essential to examine their
underlying rationales. The diverse explanations can be categorized
into three fundamental justifications. First, and quite intuitively,
whistleblower protection promotes legal compliance by
26
employers.
This justification includes the altruistic perception
that employers simply ought to comply with laws to which they are
27
subjected, as well as the notion that whistleblowing activity
encourages compliance, thereby “benefit[ing] the health, safety
28
and welfare of the public.” In-house counsel frequently engage in

25. Jonathan Armour divided the “types” of whistleblowers into three
categories: 1) passive; 2) active; and 3) embryonic. Armour, supra note 17, at 109
(discussing the “three main categories within which individual whistleblowers
fall”). “Passive” whistleblowers refuse to perform or conspire in illegal activities,
but fail to report such activities to any authorities (this still constitutes making the
“wrong” known to an internal party). Id. “Active” whistleblowers take some
“affirmative action” to challenge the impending illegal activity—such “action” may
be taken within or outside the employee’s organization. Id. Finally, “embryonic”
whistleblowers are employees that were terminated prior to “blowing the whistle,”
but were intending to do so. Id.
26. Susan J. Spicer, Turning Environmental Litigation on Its E.A.R.: The Effects of
Recent State Initiatives Encouraging Environmental Audits, 8 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 65
(1997) (introducing whistleblower laws and noting that one of the fundamental
goals of such laws are to “promote compliance with the law by the employer”).
27. See Gerard Sinzdak, An Analysis of Current Whistleblower Laws: Defending a
More Flexible Approach to Reporting Requirements, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1633, 1635–36 (2008)
(discussing the inherent value of employee-whistleblowers to the public at large and
avoidance of nefarious corporate activity).
28. Alexandra Vernoia, The Development of Global Labor Rights—Does New Jersey’s
Conscientious Employee Protection Act Export Substantive Employment Rights to Workers in
the Third World?, 33 RUTGERS L. REC. 84, 85 (2009) (quoting Feldman v. Hunterdon
Radiological Assoc., 901 A.2d 322, 329 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006)); accord
John A. Gray, Is Whistleblowing Protection Available Under Title IX?: An Hermeneutical
Divide and the Role of Courts, 12 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 671, 672–73 (2006)
(stating that “[w]histleblowers serve to protect public health and safety” and that
“the public would suffer more injuries in the absence of legal protection for
whistleblowers”).
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activities or perform duties that help ensure a company’s legal
29
compliance. Therefore, whistleblower protections help promote
or assist in-house attorneys in performing their jobs by providing
potential safeguards for those who discover and disclose harmful
information regarding noncompliance.
Whistleblowers are able to impact large and small employers
alike for numerous different reasons. One explanation is that an
employee stands in a “unique position” to discover and report
30
misconduct and wrongdoing by the employer. In fact, in-house
counsel are often in a particularly unique position—e.g.,
31
gatekeeper, business executive, compliance facilitator —that
increases the likelihood of discovery and the need to report
wrongdoing. Another possible reason for the impact of employee
whistleblowing is that employees, and especially attorneys, may be
able to discourage and dissuade their employers, and fellow
employees, from engaging in illegal or unethical conduct in the
first place—that is, before it would become necessary to “blow the
32
whistle.”
The second category of justifications is premised on
whistleblower protection that helps avoid alternative outcomes. If
33
there were no whistleblowers, the government (and indirectly, the

29. Sample v. Morgan, 935 A.2d 1046, 1063–64 (2007) (noting corporate
counsel’s role in ensuring a Board of Directors’ compliance with its legal and
equitable duties); Carol E. Dinkins et al., Ethics and Professional Responsibility in
Environmental Litigation, in A.L.I.-A.B.A., ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION 1175 (2009)
(“Lawyers play a key role in helping companies and their officials comply with the
law and act in the entity’s best interests.”); Duggin, supra note 9, at 1012
(“Whether or not the formal corporate compliance function reports directly to the
general counsel, the general counsel and other in-house lawyers play a major role
in ensuring legal compliance throughout the entity.” (citation omitted)).
30. Sinzdak, supra note 27, at 1635.
31. See supra notes 4, 6, 9 and accompanying text.
32. Sinzdak, supra note 27, at 1635 (“[Employees] can alert employers to
problems before those problems escalate. If an employer refuses to resolve an
issue, employees may be the only parties capable of reporting the problem to
external authorities.”).
33. Purported reasons for nondisclosure (or refraining from whistleblowing)
are widespread and highly individualized—ranging from personal judgment and
ethical viewpoint to social pressures and perceptions, organizational mechanisms,
and retaining employment. See Armour, supra note 17, at 109–10, 112 (personal
judgment, social perception, and retaining employment); Robert Jackall,
Whistleblowing & Its Quandaries, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1133, 1133–35 (2007)
(ethical viewpoint, social pressure, and institutional difficulties); Kimberly
Kirkland, Confessions of a Whistleblower: A Law Professor’s Reflections on the Experience of
Reporting a Colleague, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1105, 1123–24 (2007) (ethical
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taxpayers) would be forced to expend greater resources on
34
detecting and investigating illegal activity and corruption. Even if
potential whistleblowers overcome some of their obstacles, they
would face significant career and financial risk without
35
whistleblower protection.
Therefore, from a public policy
standpoint, whistleblower protections help prevent at least two
unfavorable consequences: 1) increased expenditures for
discovering misconduct; and 2) fewer whistleblowers (or
individuals with a similar mindset) to begin with.
The final rationale and many of its derivative arguments are
founded on an inherent sense of unfairness and injustice that
would result in the absence of whistleblower protection.
Essentially, this type of reasoning hinges on the assertion that we
36
ought not punish individuals for trying to do the right thing.
Furthermore, it is appropriate to protect principled employees,
including in-house counsel, from adverse employment actions,
“coerced participation” in illegal, criminal, or unethical conduct,
37
and “the danger caused by the underlying [illegal acts].” This
sense of fairness, which underlies the desire to protect individuals
that “do the right thing,” comports with the moral and legal
complexity inherent in the job of the in-house counsel, especially
38
with respect to the “good cop, bad cop” dichotomy.
C. Legal Framework for Whistleblower Protection
Numerous federal statutes provide varying forms of
whistleblower protection. The Whistleblower Protection Act of
39
1989 (WPA) forbids the federal government and any of its
authorized employees from:

viewpoint and social pressure).
34. Sinzdak, supra note 27, at 1636 (“[I]nformation provided by
whistleblowers can substantially reduce the cost to the public of detection and
investigation of wrongdoing or corruption.”).
35. Gray, supra note 28, at 672–73 (discussing the various rationales for
whistleblower protection and the impact on employees without such protection).
36. “[I]t is unjust to penalize individuals for reporting what they reasonably
and in good faith believe to be conduct that is not only unethical and/or illegal
but also sufficiently dangerous to others, physically or economically, that it must
be stopped . . . .” Id. at 673.
37. Spicer, supra note 26, at 65.
38. See supra Part I; infra Part III.A.
39. Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (codified in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C.).
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tak[ing] or fail[ing] to take, or threaten[ing] to take or
fail to take, a personnel action with respect to any
employee or applicant for employment because of—(A)
any disclosure of information by an employee or applicant
which the employee or applicant reasonably believes
evidences—(i) a violation of any law, rule, or regulation,
or (ii) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an
abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to
40
public health or safety.
In effect, the WPA proscribes adverse job actions based on any
employee conduct that may be fairly characterized as
whistleblowing (e.g., disclosures of illegality or danger to the
public). The WPA only protects federal employees; therefore, it
41
does not apply to employees of private organizations. However,
many different federal statutes contain whistleblower provisions
42
that apply to private employees in certain circumstances. Federal
statutes protecting whistleblowers in private companies are typically
limited in scope. Several of the more recent and notable
congressional acts that afford whistleblowers at least some
43
protection include the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), the

40. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A)(i)–(ii) (2006) (emphasis added).
41. Id. § 2302.
42. Whistleblower provisions are often included as just one mechanism within
greater enforcement schemes contemplated in many substantively disparate
federal statutes. E.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2622(a) (2006)
(protecting employees that commence or cause to be commenced, testify in, or
otherwise assist or participate in an action under this Act, which pertains to
reporting, testing, and other restrictions relating to chemical substances);
Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (2006) (protecting
employees that file any complaint, institute or cause to be instituted any
proceeding, testify in any proceeding, or exercise a right relating to this Act, which
pertains to the safety of workplace environments and known workplace hazards);
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42
U.S.C. § 9610(a) (2006) (protecting employees that provide information to the
government, file, institute or cause to be filed or instituted any proceeding, or
testify in any proceeding relating to this Act, which established the “Super Fund”
to organize and administer hazardous waste cleanup efforts); see also The
Whistleblower Protection Program, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
http://63.234.227.130/dep/oia/whistleblower/index.html (last visited Mar. 26,
2011) (explaining the Whistleblower Protection Program).
43. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.). Sections 806 and 1107 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
(SOX) collectively prohibit adverse employment actions against employees of
public companies that disclose fraudulent activity, as well as criminalize retaliatory
employment actions based on such disclosures. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1513(3), 1514A
(Supp. IV 2004).
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American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), and
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
45
of 2010 (DFA). Some whistleblower provisions specifically apply
46
to attorneys—and most often affect in-house counsel.
Almost all states have some sort of protection for private sector
47
whistleblowers.
Twenty-eight states have whistleblower statutes
that, similar to the WPA, only protect “public sector,” or
48
Twenty states have whistleblower
governmental, employees.
statutes that provide protection for both private and public sector
49
employees. Forty of the states that have statutory whistleblower
protection also recognize a common law claim for retaliatory
50
discharge as an exception to the employment at-will doctrine.

44. Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 6 U.S.C., 19 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C, and 47 U.S.C.); see also Ian D.
Prior & Lisa Skehill, Beware the Federal Government Bearing Gifts: How the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 Could Become a Whistleblowing Trojan Horse, 43
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 565, 567 (2010) (“Section 1553(a) of the ARRA prohibits any
non-federal employer receiving federal stimulus funds from firing, demoting, or
otherwise discriminating against an employee who undertakes protected action
under the ARRA.”).
45. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 7 U.S.C., 12 U.S.C, 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., 42
U.S.C.); see also Drew A. Harker et al., Whistleblower Incentives and Protections in the
Financial Reform Act, 127 BANKING L.J. 779 (2010) (discussing various whistleblower
provisions in the DFA). One example of whistleblower protection is provided in
section 922 of the DFA, which prohibits retaliation (e.g., termination or other
adverse employment actions) against an employee of a public company who
provides information or assists in an investigation relating to a violation of
Securities and Exchanges Commission rules or regulations, among other
violations of law. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (Supp. IV 2004).
46. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245(1) (2006)
(“[R]equiring an attorney to report evidence of a material violation of securities
law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation.”); see also Nicola Laver,
Revealing the Truth, INT’L B. NEWS, Dec. 2010, at 14, 18 (noting that the
whistleblower provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act protect some in-house lawyers).
47. David Aron, “Internal” Business Practices?: The Limits of Whistleblower
Protection for Employees Who Oppose or Expose Fraud in the Private Sector, 25 A.B.A. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 277, 297 tbl. 1 (2010) (indicating that Alabama and Georgia are the
only “[s]tates without a whistleblower statute for private sector employees or a
retaliatory discharge cause of action”).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. Common law rights and claims, such as retaliatory discharge, certainly
supplement the statutory whistleblower protections and bolster whistleblowers’
litigation efforts against former employers. While the existence and enforcement
of common law rights are very important for whistleblowers, they will not be
discussed in great depth in this article. The focus of this article is on legislative
recognition of whistleblower protections as codified in whistleblower statutes and
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Despite widespread acknowledgement of the need to protect
whistleblowers, the standards applied and the extent of their
51
protection varies greatly. Moreover, the outcome of whistleblower
cases, especially those involving attorneys, tend to be somewhat
52
unpredictable.
Notwithstanding the diverse statutory and common law
principles, all of the state approaches, and all plausible alternatives,
can be classified into one of four conceptual frameworks for
protecting whistleblowers and deterring employer misconduct that
would necessitate whistleblowing activity. The first, and historically
primary, approach has been based on “retaliation-based
53
remedies.” Generally, this entails statutory provisions or common
law rights that amount to a retaliatory discharge cause of action for
54
the terminated employee (attorney or non-attorney). That is to
say wrongful discharge claims “traditionally require the plaintiff to
show that he [or she] was terminated or constructively discharged
55
for his [or her] whistleblowing.”
56
Next are the “reward-based” or “incentive-based” models.
Quite intuitively, the concept behind this method is to provide
“financial rewards to individual whistleblowers for their
disclosures,” thereby promoting the disclosure of employer
57
misconduct.
While it is relatively uncommon for statutes to
expressly permit such economic incentives, a few federal statutes,
58
most notably the False Claims Act, have been successful in
encouraging and compensating whistleblowers for important
59
disclosures. However, it is highly improbable that any common
the treatment of such statutes by the judiciary.
51. See generally id. (showing a table illustrating the great diversity of
approaches to whistleblower protection adopted by various states).
52. Alex B. Long, Whistleblowing Attorneys and Ethical Infrastructures, 68 MD. L.
REV. 786, 797 (2009) (“[T]he results [of attorney-whistleblower cases] are even
more unpredictable than in cases of non-lawyer whistleblowers.”).
53. Elizabeth C. Tippett, The Promise of Compelled Whistleblowing: What the
Corporate Governance Provisions of Sarbanes Oxley Mean for Employment Law, 11 EMP.
RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 1, 4 (2007) (introducing and describing the three most
common models of “protecting whistleblowers and promoting the public interest
their disclosures serve” (citation omitted)).
54. Id. at 5–7.
55. Id. at 7.
56. Id. at 8. Some colloquially refer to these approaches as “bounty-hunter”
models. Id. at 8–9.
57. Id. at 9.
58. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (2006).
59. Tippett, supra note 53, at 9.
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law or statutory scheme would afford any financial reward for
attorneys to “blow the whistle,” thereby providing an incentive to
potentially violate professional and ethical rules (e.g., client
confidentiality).
The third type of approach is an incentive-based model
60
directed at employers. Contrary to the aforementioned “rewardbased” models that remunerate employees for whistleblowing, this
approach rewards employers for proactively identifying and
61
attempting to remedy wrongdoing within their own organizations.
The means by which organizations can be incentivized and the
manner in which employers promote whistleblowing is more
dynamic and less constrained than in the case of an individual
whistleblower. The organizational actions most responsive to
incentives are the creation or improvement of internal
investigatory, compliance, and reporting mechanisms, as well as
systems supporting potential and actual whistleblowers (e.g.,
62
protecting them from harassment). The most prevalent “rewards”
for employers may include reduced criminal penalties, availability
63
of affirmative defenses, and reduced civil liability. While in-house
counsel would not be personally incentivized, attorneys would likely
be involved in establishing and/or operating the internal feedback
64
mechanisms resulting from this approach.
65
This
The final category consists of “punitive approaches.”
subset includes an approach known as “mandatory whistleblowing,”
which imposes liability or other penalties, in specified
circumstances, on actors that had an opportunity to disclose illegal
66
misconduct but failed to do so.
Statutes providing for such
liability are “exceedingly rare,” and in many instances “uniformly
67
opposed” as contrary to fundamental notions of liberty.
Moreover, compulsory disclosure would often contravene many

60. Id. at 10.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 10–11 (discussing “Employer Incentives for Investigating
Wrongdoing”).
63. Id. at 10. All of the employer “rewards” are circumstantial, highly factsensitive, and only potentially beneficial to the employer in the proper instances—
in other words, they are not guaranteed. Id. (noting the judicial uncertainty in
these matters and the possible standards applied).
64. See supra notes 9, 29 and accompanying text.
65. Tippett, supra note 53, at 11.
66. Id. at 14.
67. Id. at 11–12.
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D. The Basics of a Whistleblower Claim
Before delving deeper into the legal issues implicated by inhouse counsel as whistleblowers, it is useful to understand the
general components of a claim for whistleblower protection by any
employee (attorney or non-attorney). For illustrative purposes,
consider Minnesota Statutes section 181.932 (hereinafter
69
“Minnesota Whistleblower Statute” or “Whistleblower Statute”).
The Minnesota Whistleblower Statute prohibits an employer
(public or private) from discharging, disciplining, or “otherwise
discriminat[ing]” against an employee because “the employee . . .
in good faith, reports a violation or suspected violation of any
federal or state law or rule adopted pursuant to law to an employer
70
or to any governmental body or law enforcement official.” The
statute, as supplemented and interpreted by the common law, has
three main elements: 1) the employee made a report; 2) the
employee suffered an adverse job action; and 3) there was a causal
connection between the report being made and the adverse job
action(s).
A “report” can generally be described as a communication in
which an employee “relat[es] or present[s] concerns in an
71
essentially official manner.”
The report “must implicate a
72
violation or suspected violation” of the law. This “violation of law”
requirement precludes as a “report,” for whistleblower purposes,
73
any communication which only implicates common law violations,
74
or unethical or
internal employer policy infringements,
68. See infra Part V.
69. MINN. STAT. § 181.932 (2010).
70. Id. § 181.932, subdiv. 1(1).
71. Janklow v. Minn. Bd. of Exam’rs for Nursing Home Adm’rs, 536 N.W.2d
20, 23 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995). Although “essentially official manner” implicates
some degree of formality, it does not necessarily require a writing. Buytendorp v.
Extendicare Health Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 826, 834 (8th Cir. 2007).
72. Obst v. Microtron, Inc., 614 N.W.2d 196, 200 (Minn. 2000). The violation
may be of federal law, state law, or rules promulgated pursuant to said laws. Id. at
204.
73. Nichols v. Metro. Ctr. for Indep. Living, Inc., 50 F.3d 514, 517 (8th Cir.
1995) (establishing that internal management problems or “breach” of internal
policies are not violations of law).
74. Obst, 614 N.W.2d at 204 (explaining that breach of contract, a common
law claim, does not implicate a violation of law).
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reprehensible conduct (where there is no statute or rule to make
75
such conduct illegal). Prior to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s
decision in Kidwell, a “report” could not be made by an employee in
the course of his or her job duties—that is to say, there was a job
76
duty exception. Finally, a purported whistleblower must act in
77
good faith with the purpose of exposing an illegality.
“Good
faith” does not extend to protect employees who subjectively
thought the conduct was unlawful or ought to be unlawful, but in
fact violated no law (i.e., the facts as reported constituted lawful
78
conduct). Instead, if an employee reports facts in good faith, the
question becomes whether those facts, assuming their accuracy,
79
constitute a violation of law.
All of the aforementioned elements of a whistleblower claim
apply to the case of an in-house counsel whistleblower. However,
an in-house counsel faces further legal, and ethical, issues not
necessarily explicated by non-attorney whistleblower cases.
III. KIDWELL AND THE IN-HOUSE WHISTLEBLOWER PROBLEM
A. The In-House Counsel’s Unique Dilemma
Most, if not all, whistleblowers were at one point forced to
make a very difficult decision—one they likely agonized over—
weighing the legal, professional, and ethical implications. In-house
counsel, as attorney-employees, undoubtedly struggle with the same
75. Hedglin v. City of Willmar, 582 N.W.2d 897, 902 (Minn. 1998) (“While we
find such conduct reprehensible . . . we can find no statute or rule that is violated
by such conduct . . . .”).
76. Freeman v. Ace Tel. Ass’n, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1139 (D. Minn. 2005)
(“A report that is presented as part of an employee’s job duties is not a report
under the Act.”); Gee v. Minn. State Colls. & Univs., 700 N.W.2d 548, 556 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2005) (noting that the purported whistleblowing conduct was done “to
fulfill [job] responsibilities”). For a discussion of the job duty exception and its
purported rejection by the Kidwell plurality, see infra Parts III.C, IV.
77. See Obst, 614 N.W.2d at 202. For a more detailed explanation of the good
faith requirement, see infra note 111 and accompanying text and Part VI.
78. Kratzer v. Welsh Cos., LLC, 771 N.W.2d 14, 22 (Minn. 2009).
79. Id. In other words, good faith may potentially permit a whistleblower to
inaccurately describe the facts or base his or her decision on facts that were not
absolutely accurate (assuming those facts were obtained and reported in good
faith). This good faith distinction invariably reflects a policy decision to protect
whistleblowers who knew the law correctly and thought (in good faith) that he or
she knew the correct facts, but not to protect purported whistleblowers who knew
the correct facts and thought (even in good faith) that they constituted a violation
of law.
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tensions. However, by nature of the legal profession, in-house
counsel face further complications and greater uncertainty than
other whistleblowers.
“The lawyer for an organization . . . is both an agent and a
fiduciary for the organization—and to it flow all the ethical and
legal duties a lawyer owes to any client, including the duties of
80
loyalty, confidentiality, and competence.” Despite the fact that an
81
attorney’s legal duties generally mirror his or her ethical duties,
an attorney’s decision whether to blow the whistle is riddled with
complexity, to wit:
In determining how to proceed, the lawyer shall give due
consideration to the seriousness of the violation and its
consequences, the scope and nature of the lawyer’s
representation, the responsibility in the organization and
the apparent motivation of the person involved, the
policies of the organization concerning such matters and
any other relevant considerations. While the lawyer’s primary
obligation is to protect the organization, the lawyer must
act with caution: [a]ny measures taken shall be designed
to minimize disruption of the organization and the risk of
revealing information relating to the representation to
82
persons outside the organization.
Not only are numerous factors to be contemplated and
arguably—if not inherently—conflicting interests weighed, but
attorneys also ought to take into account “any other relevant
considerations.” This unrestrictive language seems to implicate, at
least potentially, one’s morals and individual principles, among
other possible deliberations—that is to say, what one considers
“relevant” is likely to be based upon one’s own ethical viewpoint.
While consideration of sets of factors as indicia of one
outcome or another may align directly with the thought process of
many attorneys, an attorney’s whistleblowing decision is not nearly
as simple as tallying up all conceivable factors into neat columns
80. John M. Burman, Ethical Considerations when Representing Organizations, 3
WYO. L. REV. 581, 613 (2003) (providing an overview of a lawyer’s ethical duties
when representing an organization).
81. See id. at 624–25 (“As a general matter, a lawyer owes every client an
ethical duty of competence, which ‘requires the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.’ The
legal duty is similar. A lawyer is held to the standard of ‘a reasonable, careful and
prudent lawyer . . . .’” (citation omitted)).
82. Id. at 615 (emphasis added) (citing WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.
1.13(b) (2002)).
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and conducting an objective cost-benefit analysis. Instead, an inhouse counsel has at least one major consideration that outside
attorneys do not have in facing an ethical or legal dilemma caused
83
by a client’s misconduct or illegal activity. This key deliberation
84
has been called an in-house counsel’s “Hobson’s Choice”: the
decision whether to “report on his client’s wrong-doing (thereby
saving lives, but being fired) or keep quiet (thereby endangering
85
lives, but retaining his job).”
In-house counsel cannot simply
withdraw from a case or refuse to represent a particular client and
forego some attorney’s fees; rather, an in-house counsel may have
to choose between his or her morals and his or her job, thereby
86
potentially sacrificing her entire salary and livelihood.

83. “Outside attorney,” or “outside counsel,” for purposes of this article,
refers to any attorney who represents his or her clients solely as an independent
attorney and agent and is not an employee of any client he or she represents. For
a definition of “in-house counsel,” see supra note 3.
84. A “Hobson’s choice” is defined as “an apparently free choice when there is
no real alternative; the necessity of accepting one of two or more equally
objectionable alternatives.”
MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/hobsons+choice?show=0&t=1308532932 (last visited June
18, 2011) (defining Hobson’s Choice).
85. C. Evan Stewart, In-House Counsel as Whistleblower: A Rat with a Remedy?, in
PRACTISING L. INST., ETHICS IN CONTEXT 2009 145, 148 (2009). Depending on the
context of the situation and the nature and severity of the organization’s
wrongdoing, a whistleblower may or may not be “saving lives.” However, it is
relatively clear, and consistently asserted, that whistleblowers do, in fact, have an
important role in protecting the public and “benefit[ting] the health, safety and
welfare of the public.” See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
86. At-will employees deciding whether to blow the whistle deal with basically
the same predicament faced by in-house counsel. Both are subject to termination
by their employer and both rely on their employer as their sole (or main) source
of income and benefits. See Michael P. Sheehan, Comment, Retaliatory Discharge of
In-House Counsel: A Cause of Action—Ethical Obligations v. Fiduciary Duties, 45 DEPAUL
L. REV. 859, 895–96 (1996) (“[In-house] counsel possess nearly all the same
characteristics of the ordinary at-will employee.”). Therefore, non-attorney, at-will
employees generally face the same practical and ethical dilemma as in-house
counsel when confronted with a whistleblowing decision. See id. at 896. However,
the main distinction between attorneys and non-attorneys in this context is that
attorneys are subject to professional ethical rules which complicate the decision,
make the consequences graver, and put in-house counsel in a unique position that
produces a “more difficult battle.” Thomas A. Kuczajda, Note, Self Regulation,
Socialization, and the Role of Model Rule 5.1, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 119, 137–38
(1998) (arguing for increased obligations for law firm partners in enforcing
ethics).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011

17

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 4 [2011], Art. 4

2011]

“IN-HOUSE” WHISTLEBLOWER

1885

Despite the evident complexity of a whistleblowing decision,
opponents of whistleblower protection assert that in-house counsel
87
do not even have a decision to make or a choice in the matter.
They essentially claim that it is not even a “Hobson’s Choice”
88
because there is no “apparently free choice.” Instead, attorneys
simply have an obligation of utmost loyalty and faithfulness to their
clients—without regard to any misconduct or illegality—unless
absolutely required under professional ethical standards. They
further maintain that “it would be inappropriate for the
employer/client to bear the economic costs and burdens of their
89
in-house counsel’s adhering to their ethical obligations.” Instead,
as the argument goes, attorneys who have “willingly chosen to enter
90
their profession[] should bear these costs and burdens.”
Moreover, opponents rely on the history and nature of the legal
profession to assert that whistleblowing is contrary to the
fundamental tenets of the profession and that any whistleblowing
activity represents a “further slide down the slippery slope on which
[the legal] profession has been riding—away from the ideals of
zealous client representation, based upon the bedrock principle of
clients’ absolute confidence in their attorneys’ duty of
91
confidentiality.”
However deeply rooted in history or fundamental to the legal
profession, the duty of zealous advocacy is not absolute. There are
express and implicit constraints to this duty. “A lawyer is not
bound . . . to press for every advantage that might be realized for a
92
client.” This indicates a necessity for discretion on behalf of an
attorney and also implies that there are restrictions to the duty of
93
zealous representation. The outer limits of permissible advocacy

87. E.g., Balla v. Gambro, 584 N.E.2d 104, 109 (Ill. 1991) (“In-house counsel
do not have a choice of whether to follow their ethical obligations as attorneys
licensed to practice law, or follow the illegal and unethical demands of their
clients. In-house counsel must abide by the Rules of Professional Conduct.”).
88. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
89. Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 110.
90. Stewart, supra note 85, at 148.
91. Id. at 153.
92. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3, cmt. 1 (2010) (emphasis added);
accord MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3, cmt. 1 (2008).
93. Unfortunately, “[t]he Model Rules do not integrate the limitation on
zealous advocacy into any rule and thus fail to develop the standard of legal
conduct for instances in which zealous advocacy may be inappropriate.” Henry
Ordower, Toward a Multiple Party Representation Model: Moderating Power Disparity, 64
OHIO ST. L.J. 1263, 1312 (2003) (arguing for a multiple client representation
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undoubtedly end where express provisions of professional rules, or
94
other laws, govern. For example, the duty of zealous advocacy
does not require, or even permit, an attorney to violate any other
rules of professional conduct, commit fraud or misrepresentation,
or engage in criminal acts that “reflect[] adversely on the
95
lawyer’s . . . fitness as a lawyer . . . .”
Therefore, in some
circumstances, the public interest prevails over an attorney’s duty
to his or her client. Similarly, in certain instances, whistleblowing
by attorneys may produce a greater societal benefit where the
public’s interest in obtaining information and preventing
wrongdoing is stronger than the general need for ardent and
96
diligent representation of clients.
The disparate interests at stake and varying rationales
implicate personal ethics, legal rules, and professional standards—
many of which consistently conflict with each other.
The
Minnesota Supreme Court recently grappled with these precise
97
issues when it decided the case of Kidwell v. Sybaritic, Inc.

model in non-litigation practice).
94. Douglas R. Richmond, The Ethics of Zealous Advocacy: Civility, Candor and
Parlor Tricks, 34 TEX. TECH L. REV. 3, 58 (2002) (“Zealous advocacy does not
encompass or excuse lawyers’ intentional violations of ethics rules.”). One
commentator has even argued that “[a]dherence to the principle of zealous
advocacy at the expense of all else leads to absurd results.” Joshua K. Simko, Note,
Inadvertent Disclosure, the Attorney-Client Privilege, and Legal Ethics: An Examination
and Suggestion for Alaska, 19 ALASKA L. REV. 461, 468 (2002) (emphasis added)
(examining waiver of attorney-client privilege in situations of inadvertent
disclosure).
95. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(b) (2010) (defining
misconduct); accord MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (2008).
96. Rules of professional conduct that limit the scope of diligent
representation are to some extent analogous to whistleblower statutes because
both effectively limit or trump the duty of zealous advocacy. However, there is one
main distinction: professional rules preclude an attorney from engaging in conduct
deemed unprofessional or unethical, while whistleblower statutes permit employees
(including in-house counsel) to take affirmative actions to expose illegality or
wrongdoing. Refraining from certain behavior proscribed by professional rules
may or may not impact a client’s decision to engage in any sort of misconduct.
Therefore, whistleblower statutes go further by allowing attorneys to divulge
information relating to wrongdoing, thereby increasing the likelihood that
another party, internally or externally, will prevent or impede such wrongdoing.
This is a good example of the complexity and ethical dilemma faced by in-house
counsel serving as both “good cop” and “bad cop.” See supra Part I.
97. 784 N.W.2d 220 (Minn. 2010).
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B. Kidwell Prior to the Supreme Court
Kidwell is the most recent case in which a state’s highest court
interpreted a state whistleblower statute or any other state
98
whistleblower protections.
Therefore, Kidwell will be used as a
reference point for further analysis of matters relating to
whistleblower statutes. In particular, the subsequent sections will
delve into the two critical interpretation issues contemplated in
99
Kidwell: 1) the job duty exception; and 2) client confidentiality. In
order to fully analyze these topics, alternative options, and
recommended solutions or outcomes, it is first necessary to
understand the Kidwell case.
1.

Facts Giving Rise to Kidwell
100

Attorney Brian Kidwell served as in-house general counsel
for Sybaritic, Inc. until his employment was terminated in May,
101
2005. On April 24, 2005, Kidwell sent to Sybaritic’s management
team an email titled “A Difficult Duty,” (hereinafter “Difficult Duty
email”) in which Kidwell expressed his concern regarding the
company’s “pervasive culture of dishonesty” and also identified
102
several specific transgressions.
The email indicated that, if
Sybaritic and its management team did not mitigate current and
prevent future misconduct, it was Kidwell’s “intention to advise the
98. Kidwell was decided on June 24, 2010. Id. at 220. The California Supreme
Court is the only state supreme court that has more recently reviewed a
whistleblower case—deciding Murray v. Alaska Airlines, Inc. on August 23, 2010.
237 P.3d 565 (Cal. 2010). However, in Murray, the court interpreted a federal
whistleblower statute, not a state statute or other state whistleblower protections.
See id. at 569.
99. See infra Parts IV, V.
100. Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 223. As general counsel, Kidwell explained that he
was “responsible for providing advice on any legal affairs of the company,” which
included supervising litigation, contract assistance, and employment law issues. Id.
at 221. His employment agreement with Sybaritic described Kidwell’s role quite
generally: “To assist the President in assuming responsibility and decisions as to all
corporate legal matters, and the general legal administration of activities at
Sybaritic.” Id.
101. Id. at 223.
102. Id. at 221–22. In explicating the “pervasive culture of dishonesty,” Kidwell
described several unethical and illegal acts or omissions by the company,
including: 1) failure to investigate dishonest salespeople; 2) permitting an
employee to engage in the unauthorized practice of medicine; 3) failure to pay
certain taxes; and 4) obstruction of justice, obstruction of a court order, and
potential Rule 11 sanctions for a failure to disclose “smoking gun” emails pursuant
to discovery orders in pending litigation. Id. at 222.
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103

appropriate authorities of these facts.”
Unbeknownst to the
Sybaritic management team, Kidwell also sent the Difficult Duty
email to his father, with whom Kidwell had discussed his “ethical
104
dilemma.”
On April 25, 2005, Kidwell met with members of the
management team and they constructed a plan for resolving the
105
issues raised in the Difficult Duty email.
Three weeks later,
106
Kidwell was terminated from his position as general counsel.
Sybaritic maintained that Kidwell was not terminated because of
the content of his Difficult Duty email or the manner in which he
approached the situation.
Rather, Sybaritic claimed that it
“experienced a series of problems with Kidwell over the three-week
period following receipt of the ‘Difficult Duty’ email” and it “could
no longer trust [him],” especially after discovering the email
107
Kidwell sent to his father.
2.

The District Court Decision

Kidwell filed suit against Sybaritic claiming it violated the
108
Sybaritic filed a counterclaim
Minnesota Whistleblower Statute.
109
alleging breach of fiduciary duty and conversion. After rejecting
Sybaritic’s requested jury instructions, the district court instructed
the jury that recovery under the Whistleblower Statute requires
that: 1) an employee engaged in “protected activity;” 2) the
employee suffered an adverse employment action; and 3) there was

103. Id. at 223.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 224. While sending the Difficult Duty email to his father was a
purported factor in Kidwell’s termination, this precise event was not concentrated
on by any of the Minnesota appellate courts. The fact that Kidwell sent the
Difficult Duty email to his father is only directly relevant to the claim of breach of
fiduciary duty. See infra note 113. The communication to Kidwell’s father could
never be construed as protected activity under the Minnesota Whistleblower
Statute as his father is neither “an employer [nor] a[] governmental body or law
enforcement official.” MINN. STAT. § 181.932 subdiv. 1(1) (2008). Furthermore,
Chief Justice Magnuson, in his concurrence, discussed only the consequence of the
breach of fiduciary duty, and not the breaching action itself. See Kidwell, 784
N.W.2d at 232–34 (Magnuson, C.J., concurring). The courts properly focused on
the Difficult Duty email Kidwell sent to Sybaritic’s management team and whether
that discrete activity was protected under the Whistleblower Statute. See infra notes
124–37, 141, and accompanying text.
108. Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 221 (plurality opinion) (alleging violation of MINN.
STAT. § 181.932 (2008)).
109. Id.
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a causal connection between the protected activity and adverse
110
Protected activity is defined as a good faith
employment action.
report of a violation of law to the employer or a governmental body
with the purpose of “blowing the whistle” (that is, with the purpose
111
of exposing an illegality).
The jury found that Kidwell engaged
in protected activity, suffered an adverse employment action, and
his reporting of illegal conduct was a “substantial motivating factor”
112
in his termination. Therefore, the jury found in favor of Kidwell
113
and awarded him $197,000, plus fees and costs.
3.

The Court of Appeals Decision

The Minnesota Court of Appeals decided that attorneys are
not per se barred from bringing a claim under Minnesota’s
Whistleblower Statute, thus Kidwell was properly allowed to
114
proceed with his case.
However, the court held that “an
employee does not engage in protected conduct under the
whistleblower act if the employee makes a report in fulfillment of
115
the duties of his or her job.” The court concluded that Kidwell’s
110. Id. at 224–25. The district court’s jury instructions provided, in relevant
part:
To recover under the Act, Brian Kidwell must prove . . . he engaged in
protected activity, he suffered an adverse employment action . . . and
there was a casual [sic] connection between the protected activity and
the adverse employment action.
“Protected activity” is an employee’s conduct in making a good faith
report of an actual or suspected violation of a state or federal law to an
employer or to any governmental body or law enforcement official.
An employee engages in a protected activity under the Act if the
purpose . . . was to “blow the whistle” for the purpose of exposing an
illegality . . . .
To determine whether a report was made in good faith, you must look
not only at the content of the report, but also at Mr. Kidwell’s job and
purpose in making the report at the time the report was made . . . .
Id. (emphasis added).
111. Id. at 224–25, 227.
112. Id. at 225.
113. Id.
With respect to Sybaritic’s counterclaims, the district court
determined as a matter of law that Kidwell breached his fiduciary duty to Sybaritic
(because of the email Kidwell sent to his father, an individual outside of the
company), but left the determination of damages to the jury. Id. The jury found
that Sybaritic suffered no damages as a result of the breach. Id. Also, the jury
awarded $2,000 to Sybaritic after finding against Kidwell on the conversion claim.
Id.
114. Kidwell v. Sybaritic, Inc., 749 N.W.2d 855, 864 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008).
115. Id. at 866 (citing Grundtner v. Univ. of Minn., 730 N.W.2d 323 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2007); Michaelson v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 474 N.W.2d 174 (Minn. Ct.
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report of noncompliance was intended “to fulfill the duties of his
116
Therefore, it was not
position” and not to “blow the whistle.”
protected activity under the Whistleblower Statute and Kidwell
could not recover. The court of appeals reversed the district
court’s decision and found that Sybaritic was entitled to judgment
117
as a matter of law.
C. Supreme Court: Kidwell Loses (for Two Reasons)
1.

The Plurality
118

In an opinion written by Justice Lori Gildea, the three-justice
119
The
plurality focused its analysis on statutory interpretation.
plurality quickly dismissed the appellate judges’ reasoning by
holding that “[t]he whistleblower statute does not contain any
limiting language that supports the blanket job duties exception
120
the court of appeals crafted.” However, Justice Gildea noted the
relevance of a purported whistleblower’s job duties in ascertaining
his or her good faith, which is necessary to establish protected
121
activity.
Justice Gildea analogized the Minnesota Whistleblower
122
Utilizing case law interpreting the
Statute to the federal WPA.

App. 1991)).
116. Id. This finding is the basis for the so-called “job duty” exception.
117. Id. at 869–70.
118. At the time of the Kidwell decision, Gildea was serving as an Associate
Justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court. Gildea now serves as the Chief Justice of
the Minnesota Supreme Court. See Judge Profile: Chief Justice Lorie Skjerven Gildea,
MINNESOTA JUDICIAL BRANCH, http://www.mncourts.gov/?page=31&ID=30349 (last
visited Feb. 18, 2011).
119. See Kidwell v. Sybaritic, Inc., 784 N.W.2d 220, 226–31 (Minn. 2010)
(framing the issue as the “scope of statutorily-protected conduct” and noting that
the “analysis [begins] with the language of the statute”).
120. Id. at 226. The supreme court thereby expressly denied the existence of a
job duty exception to the Minnesota Whistleblower Statute. Id.
121. Id. at 227; see supra note 110 and accompanying text.
122. Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 227–29. Since the plurality analogized the
Minnesota Whistleblower Statute to the federal Whistleblower Protection Act
(WPA) (which only applies to federal employees), it is noteworthy (even though
no court has expressly made this analogy) that federal employees can be
compared to in-house counsel because both actors play dual roles. A federal
employee is both an employee and, presumably, a United States citizen, while an
in-house counsel is both an employee and an attorney. In both positions, an
individual has a duty to his or her employer and a “duty,” at least arguably, to the
public. This dual nature causes personal moral conflict, as well as legal,
professional, and ethical implications. In Garcetti v. Ceballos, the United States
Supreme Court held that “when public employees make statements pursuant to
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WPA, namely Huffman v. Office of Personnel Management, the
plurality opinion stated that “an employee who has, as part of his
normal duties, been assigned the task of investigating and
reporting wrongdoing . . . and, in fact, reports that wrongdoing
through normal channels is not engaging in protected
124
conduct . . . .”
Based on this rule, the plurality decided that
Kidwell did not engage in protected activity and, therefore, was not
125
afforded protection under the Minnesota Whistleblower Statute.
The plurality reached this result by concluding that Kidwell failed
the good faith requirement of the Whistleblower Statute, which was
described as making a report “for the purpose of blowing the
126
whistle, i.e. to expose an illegality.”
According to Justice Gildea,
127
Kidwell’s report was within the scope of his normal job duties; his

their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First
Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their
communications from employer discipline.” 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). The Court
avoided a categorical rule, but tied protected speech to the “duties” of a federal
employee. In a similar way, the Kidwell plurality claimed to dismiss a per se job
duty exception, but relied heavily upon Kidwell’s job duties in its decision. See
infra text accompanying notes 1422–53.
123. 263 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
124. Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 228 (quoting Huffman, 263 F.3d at 1352) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The plurality made it clear that this holding did not
preclude all employees charged with investigating and reporting wrongdoing from
engaging in protected activity in all circumstances. Id. Such employees could still
prevail under the Minnesota Whistleblower Statute if: 1) they reported illegality
“outside normal channels” of communication and reported because the employee
believed that the normal channels were “unresponsive”; or 2) the report was
outside the scope of their “normal or assigned job duties.” Id. at 228–29.
125. Id. at 230–31.
126. Id. at 227 (quoting Obst v. Microtron, Inc., 614 N.W.2d 196, 202 (Minn.
2000)). The Kidwell plurality described the good faith requirement in a similar
manner as the district court, considering the same factors to determine good faith.
Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 227 (“In determining good faith, we consider not only the
content of the report, but also the employee’s purpose in making the report.”).
However, the Minnesota Supreme Court tends to focus on the purpose of
exposing an illegality as the primary, if not sole, indicator of good faith. See id. at
227–31; Obst, 614 N.W.2d at 202–03. Therefore, it is accurate to say that the
Minnesota Whistleblower Statute demands “good faith,” which in turn requires,
among other things, a showing that the report at issue was made with the purpose of
exposing an illegality.
127. Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 230. Justice Gildea concluded that, because
Kidwell was “responsible for providing advice on any legal affairs of the company,”
he performed his job function when he sent the Difficult Duty email. Id.
Additionally, Justice Gildea stated that the Difficult Duty email itself answered the
question of good faith because it “establishes that Kidwell sent it not to ‘blow the
whistle,’ but to carry out his job duties.” Id. at 230 n.9.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss4/4

24

Banick: Case Note: The "In-house" Whistleblower: Walking the Line Between

1892

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:4

128

intent was solely to advise his client; and he communicated his
129
concerns through “normal channels.”
1.

The Concurrence

The outcome of Kidwell hinged on the concurring opinion of
Chief Justice Eric Magnuson, the sole concurring justice, who
130
Notwithstanding his agreement in
decided in favor of Sybaritic.
the result, Chief Justice Magnuson reached his conclusion on
entirely different grounds than the plurality. In fact, he did not
131
once mention the scope or tasks of Kidwell’s employment.
Instead, his proposed holding was as follows: “[W]hen a lawyer
breaches his or her fiduciary duty to the client, the client has an
absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relationship. And
that right cannot be burdened by any claim from the lawyer for
132
compensation or other damages.”
In other words, if an attorney
breaches a fiduciary duty (e.g., client confidentiality), he or she
should be per se barred from protection under the Minnesota
Whistleblower Statute.
Chief Justice Magnuson noted that the Whistleblower Statute
does not expressly provide this exception, but he argued that “the
statute does not trump [the court’s] power and responsibility to
133
regulate the bar, particularly in matters of ethics.”
Accordingly,
the concurrence asserted that upon his breach of fiduciary duty
134
(determined as a matter of law by the district court), Kidwell
forfeited his right to a claim under the Minnesota Whistleblower
Statute, and Chief Justice Magnuson cast his vote in favor of

128. Id. at 230 (relying on the Difficult Duty email, which stated that Kidwell
only intended to report Sybaritic to the appropriate authorities if the company
failed to remedy its illegalities, and Kidwell’s testimony, stating that it was his goal
to “pull [Sybaritic] back into compliance”).
129. See id. (“[T]he record establishes that all of the identified recipients of the
‘Difficult Duty’ email were officials on the management team at Sybaritic with
whom Kidwell had previously discussed legal matters.”).
130. At the time of the Kidwell decision, Chief Justice Magnuson was serving as
the Chief Justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court. Chief Justice Magnuson has
since resigned and returned to private practice. Biographies of the Justices of the
Minnesota
Supreme
Court,
MINNESOTA
STATE
LAW
LIBRARY,
http://www.lawlibrary.state.mn.us/judgebio.html#magnuson (last visited Feb. 4,
2011).
131. See Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 231–34 (Magnuson, C.J., concurring).
132. Id. at 233.
133. Id.
134. See supra note 113.
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135

The Dissent

Similar to the plurality, the minority (also comprised of three
justices) focused its analysis on the statutory interpretation of the
136
Despite their comparable
Minnesota Whistleblower Statute.
analytical approach, the dissenting opinion not only reached a
contrary conclusion, but Justice Paul Anderson scathingly rebuked
137
the plurality’s reasoning and the outcome of its decision.
The
dissent rejected the plurality’s reliance on Huffman (interpreting a
138
statute with different language), its lack of deference to the jury
139
in determining state of mind, and its failure to “view[] the
140
evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict.” Under
the dissent’s construction of the Minnesota Whistleblower Statute,
a purported whistleblower must show that his or her actions were:
1) made in good faith; 2) made with the purpose of exposing an

135. See Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 233–34.
136. Id. at 234–43 (Anderson, J. Paul, dissenting). “[The court] must consider
the specific language used in the Minnesota Whistleblower Act . . . and [look] at
the case law interpreting that statute . . . .” Id. at 237.
137. The dissent used blunt and brazen language to criticize the policy
judgments, as well as the rationality, of the plurality opinion. For example:
• “The plurality has adopted a legal rule that I am unable to reconcile with
the language of the Minnesota Whistleblower Act. . . . As a consequence,
the plurality unnecessarily complicates whistleblower law in a manner
unsupported by the statutory language.” Id. at 234.
• “[T]he plurality has not demonstrated why the conclusion reached in
Huffman applies based on the language of Minnesota’s Whistleblower Act.”
Id. at 235.
• “I find no support for the plurality’s adoption of the Huffman test.
Moreover, I fail to see the wisdom or necessity for the rule advocated for by
the plurality.” Id. at 237.
• “[T]he plurality ignores . . . important principles.” Id. at 239.
• “The plurality’s rule is not based in the language of the Minnesota
Whistleblower Act.” Id. at 242.
• The dissenting opinion similarly admonished Chief Justice Magnuson’s
concurrence: “[T]he concurrence . . . cho[se] to ignore the language of
[the] statute in this case. . . . [A]s we have said many times, ‘[i]t is the duty
of this court to apply the law as written by the legislature.’” Id. (citing Int’l
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local No. 292 v. City of St. Cloud, 765 N.W.2d 64, 68
(Minn. Ct. App. 2009)) (noting that Chief Justice Magnuson wrote the
International Brotherhood opinion for a unanimous court) (last alteration in
original).
138. Id. at 235.
139. Id. at 238.
140. Id. at 240.
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illegality, or “blowing the whistle”; and 3) “not merely routine.”
IV. KIDWELL ISSUE 1: JOB DUTY EXCEPTION
A. The Issue

The plurality in Kidwell purported to refute and proscribe any
per se job duty exception under the Minnesota Whistleblower
142
Statute.
However, its opinion seems to create a test that,
although not categorical, will very rarely, if ever, protect employees
charged with monitoring or reporting compliance or other legal
issues. Several commentators have opined that the Minnesota
Supreme Court found no protection for Kidwell specifically because
his actions directly carried out his job duties, despite the plurality’s
143
alleged denial of any such exception. The plurality stated that an
alleged whistleblowing report that is made “outside normal
channels” or “outside the scope of the employee’s normal or
144
assigned job duties” could still be protected.
The dissent very
clearly opposed not only the plurality’s reasoning, but also the
consequence of its decision:

141. Id. at 239 (“[E]ven when an employee has an obligation to make a report
because of his job duties, that report should be protected if . . . the employee is
able to prove the report was not merely routine but, instead, was made in good
faith with the contemporaneous purpose of ‘blowing the whistle.’”). The
dissenting opinion asserted a different standard for proving good faith because
“an employee’s job duties or the particular channel through which the employee
makes his report” should not be dispositive on the issue of the employee’s
subjective intent (i.e., good faith). Id. at 237.
142. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
143. FREDERICK T. GOLDER & DAVID R. GOLDER, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW:
COMPLIANCE AND LITIGATION § 1:149 (3d ed. 2010) (explaining the holding in
Kidwell: “[a] former in-house attorney did not engage in conduct protected by the
Minnesota Whistleblower Act . . . [because he] made the report to management in
fulfillment of his job responsibilities”); Robert B. Fitzpatrick, Current Developments
in Employment Law: The Obama Years, Retaliation Update—Supplemental Materials, in
A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EMPLOYMENT LAW: THE
OBAMA YEARS 1371, 1371 (2010) (describing the Kidwell decision: “the in-house
lawyer did not engage in conduct protected by the state whistleblower statue
because the lawyer was fulfilling the responsibilities of his position of
employment”); Gail O’Gradney, In-House Attorney’s Conduct Not Protected by
Whistleblower Act, FLETCHER CORP. L. ADVISER, Sept. 2010, at 2 (introducing Kidwell
as a case in which “an in-house attorney did not engage in conduct protected by
the whistleblower statute because he was fulfilling his employment
responsibilities”).
144. Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 229–31.
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The plurality appears to indicate that only in a very rare
case would an employee who is responsible for reporting
illegal conduct and who reports such conduct through
normal channels, be able to prove that the report was
made for the purpose of exposing an illegality. I
disagree. . . .
....
[E]ven when an employee has an obligation to make a
report because of his job duties, that report should be
protected if, but only if, the employee is able to prove the
report was not merely routine but, instead, was made in
good faith with the contemporaneous purpose of
145
“blowing the whistle.”
The polarity of viewpoints with respect to the proper analysis
of the Whistleblower Statute, as well as the practical outcome, is
indicative of divergent policy judgments without a clearly superior
result. In fact, one commentator claims that the alleged job duty
exception is “[p]erhaps the most provocative and unsettled
146
doctrine involving whistleblowers.”
B. The Existence and Rationale of the Exception
Generally speaking, it is accepted by federal courts that a job
duty exception (or, if not so labeled, an exception to the same
147
However, some courts have
effect) applies to the federal WPA.
145. Id. at 238–39 (Anderson, J. Paul, dissenting).
146. Marshall H. Tanick, Blow the Whistle, Sound the Drum: Marking the 20th
Anniversary of Minnesota’s Whistleblower Law, 63 BENCH & B. MINN. 18, 22 (2006).
147. See, e.g., Sarah Wood Borak, The Legacy of “Deep Throat”: The Disclosure
Process of the Whistleblower Protection Act Amendments of 1994 and the No Fear Act of
2002, 59 U. MIAMI L. REV. 617, 633 (2005) (citing Huffman v. Office of Personnel
Mgmt., 263 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001)) (“[T]the WPA does not protect
whistleblowing to co-workers in the normal course of job duties.”); Yuval Feldman
& Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative Effectiveness of Rewards,
Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1151, 1167
(2010) (citing cases from five different federal circuits) (“[V]arious courts
interpreting the federal Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA) have developed
similar ‘job duty’ exceptions that exclude protection when a disclosure is made in
the ordinary course of an employee’s duties. In other words, under the ‘job duty’
defense, employees who report illegality within the scope of their work duties are
not protected from retaliation.” (citations omitted)); Orly Lobel, Citizenship,
Organizational Citizenship, and the Laws of Overlapping Obligations, 97 CAL. L. REV.
433, 448 (2009) (citing cases from six different federal circuits) (“[C]ourts
interpret the Act to exclude protection when disclosure is made pursuant to the
defined job duties of an employee. In other words, under the ‘job duty’ defense,
employees who report illegality within the scope of their work duties do not
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refused to recognize the exception, even with regards to the WPA,
and dismiss it claiming there is “no significant policy served by
extending whistle-blower protection only to those who carry a
complaint beyond the institutional wall, denying it to the employee
148
who seeks to improve operations from within the organization.”
This dissent from some federal courts is evidence of tension in an
ostensibly well-settled doctrine.
At the state level, whistleblower statutes and their respective
149
interpretations vary greatly, despite the fact that a vast majority of
150
Sixteen states have
states have enacted whistleblower statutes.
requirements regarding a whistleblower’s state of mind: ten states
“[r]equire [a] good faith belief . . . that workplace conduct violates
a statute, regulation, or rule” and six states “[r]equire [a]
reasonable belief . . . that workplace conduct violates a statute,
151
regulation, or rule.”
These requirements relating to subjective
intent are a major reason for the job duty exception (where it
exists). The exception has been characterized as a presumption
that an employee, based on his or her job duties, does not possess
the requisite state of mind (i.e., good faith) to qualify as a
152
whistleblower. Therefore, the job duty exception is a procedural
mechanism for discarding whistleblower claims that are deemed to
be meritless because of the inherent inability to prove good faith.
This alleged inability is based only on the fact that the purported
whistleblower reports wrongdoing and misconduct as a normal part
of his or her work.

receive protection from retaliation.” (citations omitted)).
148. Marques v. Fitzgerald, 99 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1996); see also Lobel, supra
note 147, at 449 (explaining that, despite its common acceptance, “some courts and
regulators have rejected the ‘job duty’ defense” (emphasis added)).
149. Rubinstein, supra note 19, at 643 (“State whistleblower laws differ on
many points including the appropriate recipient of the whistleblower report, the
subject of protected whistleblowing, the motive of the whistleblower, the required
quality of evidence of wrongdoing, and the remedies available for the
whistleblower.”).
150. See supra notes 47–52 and accompanying text.
151. Aron, supra note 47, at 297 tbl. 1.
152. Alex B. Long, Retaliatory Discharge and the Ethical Rules Governing Attorneys,
79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1043, 1045 n.10 (2008) (“Where an employee's job duties
require an employee to expose illegality, there is a presumption under Minnesota
law that the employee's purpose in making the report was to further the
employer's interest, not to expose illegality.” (emphasis added)).
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“The rationale for [the job duty] rule is that when employees
perform their job duties, they act to promote their employers’ best
153
interests, rather than to expose illegality.” In essence, employing
the job duty rule indicates that the exception is the best manner to
determine (or disprove) an employee’s good faith in engaging in
154
whistleblowing conduct.
This value judgment regarding the
method for establishing (or disproving) good faith reflects a court’s
155
policy preference regarding matters such as judicial economy,
156
fairness or merit of the outcome, the public good (at least, to the
157
extent that it is impacted by the alleged violations of law), and
158
protection of potential whistleblowers who act in good faith.
C. The Detriments of the Exception
Courts employing the job duty exception (or reasoning akin to
it) likely favor this approach to resolving state of mind issues
because it provides a bright-line rule—thus, taking the conjecture

153. William Jordan, In-House Attorneys May Recover From Their Employers for
Violations of Minnesota Whistleblowers Statute, PROF. LIAB. REP. (West), July 2008, at 5.
154. See Kidwell v. Sybaritic, Inc., 784 N.W.2d 220, 227 (Minn. 2010) (noting
that an employee’s job duties help answer the question of the employee’s purpose
in making a report, thereby also helping to resolve the issue of good faith).
155. Using an evidentiary presumption to shift the burden of proof greatly
impacts judicial efficiency and speed, both of which are important considerations
given scarce (or finite) judicial resources. Alberto B. Lopez, A Revaluation of Cy
Pres Redux, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1307, 1336 (2010) (“An underlying reason for
creating the presumption is to promote judicial economy.”).
156. A presumption recognizes an alleged fact before any direct evidence of
that fact is produced. Therefore, utilizing a presumption suggests confidence that
it accurately exhibits the “fact” attempting to be proven (in this case, that an
employee’s performance of his or her job duties is indicative of his or her real or
actual intent not to “blow the whistle”). Carolyn Wilkes Kaas, Breaking Up a Family
or Putting It Back Together Again: Refining the Preference in Favor of the Parent in ThirdParty Custody Cases, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1045, 1100 (1996) (“Presumptions are
based on the logical probability that the existence of one fact renders another fact
to be true. . . . [T]he root of the presumption . . . is the nexus of probability: when
one fact is true, the other usually follows.”).
157. Employing this particular presumption reflects a judgment as to the
public good insofar as the presumption discourages whistleblowing and/or harms
the public good that is to be protected by whistleblowers.
158. Hearing on Private Sector Whistleblowers Before the H. Comm. on Educ. and
Labor and the H. Subcomm. on Workforce Prots., 110th Cong. 33 (2007) (statement of
Richard E. Moberly, Associate Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of
Law) (“[I]t is simply too easy for good-faith whistleblowers to fall through the gaps
created by these varied requirements . . . .”), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_house_hearings
&docid=f:35185.pdf.
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159

out of determining good faith.
However, one of the
disadvantages of the job duty exception—like most bright-line
160
rules—is that it is too broad.
The definition of whistleblowing
inherently necessitates a fact-sensitive inquiry regarding good faith,
161
Therefore, whistleblower claims are not
among other elements.
well-suited for a broad presumption such as the job duty exception,
which cannot adjust to the fact-intensive nature of the conduct at
issue.
Alternatively, the job duty exception and analogous analyses
are problematic because they generate an improper distinction
between internal and external reporting—that is, different legal
ramifications for “blowing the whistle” to parties inside or outside
the organization. This distinction comports with the Kidwell
plurality opinion, which affords an employee (whose job requires
investigation or reporting of misconduct) whistleblower protection
if reports are made “outside the normal channels” or “outside the
162
scope of the employee’s normal or assigned job duties.”
As a
result, employees have incomparably greater motivation to
circumvent internal reporting mechanisms entirely and “blow the
whistle” directly to external entities, including governmental law
163
enforcement agencies.
This “create[s] a perverse incentive

159. See Clarence Thomas, Judging, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 7 (1996) (“Whenever
possible, . . . judges generally should adopt clear, bright-line rules . . . .”); see also
Christopher R. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach to Coupon Settlement in Antitrust and
Consumer Class Action Litigation, 49 UCLA L. REV. 991, 1075 (2002) (“Judges
generally find it more convenient to apply bright-line rules . . . .”).
160. Anne Bowen Poulin, The Fourth Amendment: Elusive Standards; Elusive
Review, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 127, 137 (1991) (“A bright line rule necessarily cuts
too broad a swath.”).
161. Hearing on Private Sector Whistleblowers, supra note 158, at 37; see also Tenn.
Valley Auth., 60 N.R.C. 160, 189 (2004) (“Whistleblow[er] . . . cases are, by their
nature, peculiarly fact-intensive and dependent on witness credibility.”), supra note
24 and accompanying text (explaining definition of “whistleblowing” adopted for
purposes of this article).
162. Kidwell v. Sybaritic, Inc., 784 N.W.2d 220, 228–29 (Minn. 2010).
163. Jenny Mendelsohn, Calling the Boss or Calling the Press: A Comparison of
British and American Responses to Internal and External Whistleblowing, 8 WASH. U.
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 723, 729 (2009) (highlighting the “perverse incentive”
created by a distinction between internal and external whistleblowing); Sarah F.
Suma, Note, Uncertainty and Loss in the Free Speech Right of Public Employees Under
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 369, 370 (2008) (describing the same
incentive for using “improper channels”); see Lobel, supra note 147, at 445–46
(noting that different jurisdictions treat the internal-external distinction
disparately, and with different practical implications). Depending on the
applicable whistleblower statute, the only external entities to whom an employee
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whereby employees might bypass their employer-specified channels
164
of resolution and voice their concerns in public . . . .”
Finally, absent specific knowledge of employment, and
particularly whistleblower, law and its potential ramifications, it is
highly unlikely that an employee whose tasks include reporting
165
noncompliance would ever escape a job duty exception.
It is
doubtful that such an employee would ever go “outside normal
channels” (to use the Kidwell plurality’s language) because it is
precisely his or her job to report “inside” the normal channels. It is
equally improbable that such an employee would encounter
wrongdoing “outside the scope” of his or her job as the duties
explicitly entail monitoring and reporting such wrongdoing—
which leaves the argument that any wrongdoing discovered is
166
always within the scope of his or her duties.
The latter issue is
exceptionally troublesome, as was the case in Kidwell, if the
purported whistleblower is in-house counsel, who is likely to be
responsible for all legal problems and noncompliance that occur
167
within a company —thereby, essentially creating a categorical rule
for in-house counsel if the job duty exception is applied.
Consequently, it is unduly burdensome and risky for employees—
attorneys or non-attorneys—to engage in whistleblowing activity in

may “blow the whistle” are governmental actors, while others could conceivably
permit disclosure to alternate third parties, including the media. See, e.g., MINN.
STAT. § 181.932 (2008) (limiting the permissible external parties to “any
governmental body or law enforcement official”).
164. Mendelsohn, supra note 163, at 729 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The job duty exception’s external reporting incentive is “perverse” because it
“penalize[s] well-intentioned employees who attempt to rectify wrongdoing,” as
well as promote the public good by exposing crime and facilitating law
enforcement. Belline v. K-Mart Corp., 940 F.2d 184, 188–89 (7th Cir. 1991).
Furthermore, internal reporting (which is disincentivized under the job duty
exception) has other potential benefits besides exposing illegalities, including, but
not limited to: getting to the “root” of the cause quickly; preventing wrongdoing
before it harms others; and the possibility for fundamental shifts in the way
businesses view compliance and self-regulation. See Sinzdak, supra note 27, at
1635–36 (“They can alert employers to problems before those problems escalate. .
. . The presence of whistleblowers may also help deter misconduct in the first
instance.”); see also supra Part II.B (discussing how employees can impact decisions
by their employers and co-workers to engage in illegal or unethical conduct).
165. Even Kidwell, an attorney, was unable to ensure his protection after
researching whistleblower law. See Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 223.
166. See id. at 221 (relying on evidence that Kidwell was responsible for “any
legal affairs of the company” and “all corporate legal matters” to determine the
report was within the scope of his job duties).
167. Id.
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jurisdictions where a job duty exception exists.
D. Replacing or Modifying the Job Duty Exception
Based on the aforementioned defects, applying the job duty
exception is an improper interpretation of whistleblower statutes
with a flawed outcome. For jurisdictions that do not subscribe to a
job duty exception, or any similar analysis, there is no problem.
Similarly, there is no dilemma for jurisdictions seeking to prohibit a
job duty exception (as the Kidwell plurality purported to do); they
need only a “simple” common law or statutory exclusion. For
jurisdictions battling with a job duties rule, there are several other
ways to overcome the downfalls of the doctrine while retaining its
168
few benefits.
One approach is to rely on the judiciary to rectify any
problems the job duty exception has raised. Courts may interpret
the exception more narrowly so as to bar fewer whistleblowers from
a remedy for what they thought was, and what could very plausibly
be, protected conduct. Instead of relying on an employee’s “job
duties” to exclude a purported whistleblower from showing the
requisite state of mind, courts could permit the finding of good
faith where an employee’s whistleblowing activity is “not merely
169
routine” or does not occur within his or her “essential job
170
function.”
Alternatively, courts may embrace the fact-sensitive
nature of whistleblower cases and employ a “balancing” test that
171
The factors would
takes into account many considerations.
certainly include an employee’s job duties, but job duties would not
be dispositive, or in any way determinative, on the issue of good
172
faith or the whistleblower claim as a whole.

168. See supra Parts IV.B, C.
169. See Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 239 (Anderson, J. Paul, dissenting) (arguing
that employees should be protected as whistleblowers anytime their whistleblowing
activity is “not merely routine”).
170. Jamie Sasser, Comment, Silenced Citizens: The Post-Garcetti Landscape for
Public Sector Employees Working in National Security, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 759, 775–79
(2007) (arguing for the application of the “essential job function” standard in lieu
of the “job duty” standard).
171. In theory, this approach may have been advocated by the Kidwell plurality,
but its opinion failed to implement this type of balancing as its analysis hinged
almost exclusively on Kidwell’s job duties in determining his lack of intent to be a
whistleblower. See Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 227–31 (plurality opinion).
172. See infra Part VI.
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Another manner in which a jurisdiction could effect change
regarding a disfavored job duty exception is through state or
federal legislation. One “simple” option is to make whistleblower
statutes more clear and explicit about what activities are and are
not considered protected conduct. An example of this statutory
framework exists in New Jersey, where the “Conscientious
Employee Protection Act . . . defines inclusively the activities that
173
may give rise to whistleblower protection.”
Conceptually, this
construct is appealing because it greatly reduces ambiguity, reduces
compliance costs (and risk of noncompliance), and increases
predictability in the law. This approach seems simple on its face,
but it will only be attained with great legislative difficulty in
delineating those individuals and those activities that are statutorily
deemed to be protected. However, if the barriers are overcome,
this statutory method may provide legislatures greater control over
174
whistleblowing law by allowing for less interpretation.
A different legislative approach is to retain or permit the
common law job duty exception but obviate one of its worst policy
implications—the incentive to “blow the whistle” directly to outside
175
parties.
This option hinges on statutory duties to make internal
reports regarding the wrongdoing or noncompliance before ever
seeking to “blow the whistle” externally. Under such a statute, in
order for a whistleblower to receive protection, he or she must
report wrongdoing inside the organization and give it an
176
opportunity to correct the misconduct.
As is evident, there are sufficiently diverse means by which
courts and legislatures can define whistleblower protections,
exclude meritless claims, and retain the desired flexibility without
resorting to a broad and unnecessary job duty exception.

173. Aron, supra note 47, at 292 (emphasis added) (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §
34:19-3 (West Supp. 2009)).
174. However, this framework results in a statutory version of a bright-line rule,
which could create some problems, notwithstanding the clarity and attempted
precision. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 163–176 and accompanying text.
176. Ten states currently have similar statutes that require internal reporting
and an opportunity to correct noncompliance or wrongdoing. Aron, supra note
47, at 297 tbl.1 (Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and Ohio).
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V. KIDWELL ISSUE 2: CLIENT CONFIDENTIALITY
A. The Issue
In Kidwell, the issue of client confidentiality seemed more like
a footnote to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision, as both the
plurality and dissent focused almost exclusively on statutory
interpretation and the role of the purported whistleblower’s job
177
duties. However, Chief Justice Magnuson’s concurrence decided
the outcome of the case, thereby determining whether the plurality
or dissenting views would “win” the job duties debate. More
significantly though, the concurrence raised another issue of
particular importance: the relevance and consequences of client
178
confidentiality for attorney-whistleblowers.

177. Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 221. The ethical rule at issue in Kidwell, and all
attorney-whistleblower cases, is Model Rule 1.6, which states: “A lawyer shall not
reveal information relating to the representation of a client” except in limited
prescribed circumstances. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2007). That
is to say, the issue is one of client confidentiality, not attorney-client privilege.
While both doctrines have similar policy underpinnings, and often similar results,
they are discrete principles with correspondingly disparate scopes and functions.
Jason Popp, Current Development, The Cost of Attorney-Client Confidentiality in Post
9/11 America, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 875, 876–77 (2007) (explicating the
distinctions between the duty of confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege).
It is important to note the distinction because they “often are used
interchangeably” and the “confusion is perpetuated by the courts and attorneys.”
Kristi Belt, Proceedings of the Conference on Emerging Professional
Responsibility Issues in Litigation, Recommendations of the Working Group on
Confidentiality and the Limits of Attorney-Client Privilege, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 33, 33
(1999) (presenting solutions to address problems of confidentiality and the
attorney-client privilege); Irving D. Labovitz & William J. Labovitz, Attorney-Client
Privilege in Individual Bankruptcy Cases . . . An Emerging Oxymoron?, 104 COM. L.J.
301, 302 (1999) (discussing attorney-client privilege in bankruptcy cases). The
duty of confidentiality is a professional ethical rule that prohibits an attorney from
disclosing to others any information related to the representation of a client—a
broad scope. Popp, supra note 177, at 876 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 3 (2007)). On the other hand, attorney-client privilege is a
rule of evidence that applies in the case of “compelled testimony”—which is a
narrower scope—and only protects confidential communications between an
attorney and client. Id. at 876–77. Since there is no issue of compelled testimony
in Kidwell, or most other whistleblower cases, and the matter relates only to client
information, this article focuses on the duty of client confidentiality.
178. Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 232–34 (Magnuson, C.J., concurring).
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B. The Existence and Rationale of Confidentiality
The notion that client information should not be disclosed
and ought to be protected as confidential has existed for hundreds
179
of years.
However, the actual duty of client confidentiality was
180
In 1908, the
not contemplated until close to the mid-1800s.
American Bar Association (ABA) adopted its Canons of
Professional Ethics, which provided that attorneys had an
181
obligation “not to divulge [a client’s] secrets or confidences.”
When the ABA approved its Model Code of Professional
Responsibility in 1969, it continued to recognize the “ethical
obligation of a lawyer to hold inviolate the confidences and secrets
182
of his [or her] client.” The most commonly asserted rationale for
attorney-client confidentiality has been succinctly stated in a “threestep syllogism”:
First, for the adversary system to operate, citizens must use
lawyers to resolve disputes and the lawyers must be able to
represent clients effectively. Second, attorneys can be
effective only if they have all the relevant facts at their
disposal. Third, clients will not employ lawyers, or at least
will not provide them with adequate information, unless
all aspects of the attorney-client relationship remain
secret. Thus, the systemic argument goes, attorney-client
confidentiality is the foundation of orderly and effective
183
adversarial justice.
179. Patricia M. Worthy, The Impact of New and Emerging Telecommunications
Technologies: A Call to the Rescue of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 39 HOW. L.J. 437, 455
(1996) (explaining that doctrines related to attorney-client privilege arose during
the 1500s out of “consideration for the oath and the honor of the attorney”);
Popp, supra note 177, at 876 n.8 (noting that the attorney-client privilege
originated at least as early as 1654).
180. FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 5, at 129 & n.8.
181. Id. at 130; see also Charles M. Bennett, Frontiers in Ethics: The Estate Lawyer’s
Duty of Loyalty and Confidentiality to the Fiduciary Client, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 807,
815–16 (2007) (reprinting and discussing several canons that relate to client
confidentiality). The Canons were amended in 1928 to expressly include a “duty
to preserve his client’s confidences.” FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 5, at 130.
182. Bennett, supra note 181, at 820. The ABA continues to appreciate the fact
that “full knowledge of the facts by the lawyer is essential to proper
representation.” FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 5, at 133 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
183. Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351, 358
(1989) (explaining the justifications for confidentiality).
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The temporal longevity alone indicates the significance of the
doctrine in the legal profession generally.
However,
“[c]onfidentiality in an advisory setting is extremely important in
184
the corporate atmosphere.”
For in-house attorneys, the
significance (and almost sanctity) of confidentiality seems to
directly conflict with the fact that attorneys are strictly prohibited
185
from engaging or assisting in client misconduct.
Some courts
interpret this tension as producing a single “choice” for in-house
attorneys: withdraw from representation of the client (i.e., resign
186
his or her position within the company).
The existence and
extent of the duty of confidentiality would not be problematic if inhouse attorneys had an actual “choice,” which included the
possibility of whistleblowing with subsequent protection. Yet,
extending whistleblower protection to in-house counsel presents its
own set of unique problems. “The most notable of these problems
187
involves the divulgence of client confidences . . . .”
It is precisely this divulgence, or breach of client
confidentiality, that the Kidwell concurrence attempted to
safeguard against. In the concurrence, Chief Justice Magnuson
argued for the “traditional” approach to attorney-whistleblowers—
188
that is to say, there is no protection.
This approach is generally
premised on two policy justifications: 1) whistleblower protection
would directly undermine client confidentiality and interfere with
candid communications (the fundamental reason for protection of

184. Todd John Canni, Protecting the Perception of the Public Markets: At What
Cost? The Effects of “Noisy Withdrawal” on the Long Standing Attorney-Corporate Client
Relationship, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 371, 374 (2004) (discussing the development of
the attorney-corporate client privilege).
185. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2007) (“A lawyer shall not
counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is
criminal or fraudulent . . . .”); see also Stephen C. Dillard, When Principles Clash: The
In-House Counsel as Renegade or Whistleblower, 63 DEF. COUNS. J. 206, 210 (1996)
(“[L]awyers are bound by ethical codes not to participate in client misconduct . . .
.”); supra text accompanying note 95.
186. See Dillard, supra note 185, at 210–11 (describing several decisions where
courts have disallowed whistleblower protection for attorneys).
187. Brett Lane, Comment, Blowing the Whistle on Balla v. Gambro: The
Emergence of an In-House Counsel’s Cause of Action in Tort for Retaliatory Discharge, 29 J.
LEGAL PROF. 235, 236 (2004–05) (discussing the problems of extending the tort of
retaliatory discharge to in-house counsel).
188. Chief Justice Magnuson introduced his analysis with a quote from Justice
Cardozo stating that “[m]embership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions.” Kidwell v. Sybaritic, Inc., 784 N.W.2d 220, 232 (Minn. 2010)
(Magnuson, C.J., concurring) (alteration in original).
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client confidences); and 2) whistleblower protection is simply
unnecessary because attorneys are already bound by the ethical
duties of their profession, which adequately protect the public
189
interest.
Chief Justice Magnuson based his argument on the
relative importance of the policy underpinnings of client
confidentiality: “[s]ound public policy principles underlie the
whistleblower statute, but those public policy principles do not
trump the public policy behind the fiduciary obligations [including
190
the duty of confidentiality] that lawyers owe to clients.”
The concurrence further reasoned that because clients have
an “absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relationship”
under Minnesota law—regardless of any actual damage or breach
of fiduciary obligations—an attorney has no right to compensation,
no claims for other legal recourse, and no right to breach client
191
confidences upon termination of said relationship. Therefore, it
would be inappropriate to offer attorney-whistleblowers any
statutory or common law protection when “blowing the whistle”
violates client confidentiality. In fact, the concurrence claimed
that, based on ethical rules, any attorney who breaches such
fiduciary obligations “forfeit[s] any right” to recover any damages
192
or compensation.
Finally, the concurrence argued that a
contrary holding would simply be “a further slide down the slippery
slope” degrading the attorney-client relationship and its
193
concomitant confidentiality.
Despite any alleged trend eroding fundamental tenets of the
attorney-client relationship, there has always been, and will
continue to be, a consideration of the public interest—which was
the basis for professional rules in the first place. An attorney’s duty
to his or her client is not unfettered by the public interest and an
194
attorney’s duty to the public as a whole.
Whistleblower statutes,
189. Kim T. Vu, Note, Conscripting Attorneys to Battle Corporate Fraud Without
Shields or Armor? Reconsidering Retaliatory Discharge in Light of Sarbanes-Oxley, 105
MICH. L. REV. 209, 216 (2006) (“[I]f courts grant in-house attorneys the right to
sue their employers for retaliatory discharge, employers might be less forthright
and candid with their attorneys. . . . [A]n attorney's professional rules of conduct
adequately safeguard the public policy of protecting the public interest.”).
190. Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 232.
191. Id. at 233–34.
192. Id. at 233.
193. Id. at 234. This “slippery slope” is, in part, related to the historical
importance of the attorney-client confidentiality. See supra text accompanying
notes 179–181.
194. One commentator keenly observed:
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in general, are a recognition that in certain instances the public
interest must prevail over an employee’s duty of loyalty (e.g.,
195
confidentiality) to his or her employer. Similarly, there are likely
to be instances in which the public interest overrides even the inhouse counsel’s duty of confidentiality to his or her client and
employer.
C. The Proper Impact of Confidentiality
The Kidwell dissent refuted Chief Justice Magnuson’s
concurrence mainly on grounds of statutory interpretation—
namely, that it failed to interpret the plain language of the
Whistleblower Statute, which contains no provision excepting
196
attorneys from protection. The merits of the dissent’s argument,
although interesting, are less important than the underlying
questions: whether the claims of the Kidwell concurrence are
grounded in sound legal reasoning and, in turn, whether attorneywhistleblowers ought to be afforded legal protection.
As previously discussed, there are always problems with
197
categorical or bright-line rules.
This per se bar for attorneywhistleblowers who, in the purported act of whistleblowing, breach
client confidences is no different.
The Kidwell concurrence based most of its analysis on the
ethical obligations of attorneys, including the duty to refrain from
198
disclosure of confidential information.
Yet, Chief Justice
This obligation to the public, although perhaps not articulated as clearly
as the obligation to a client, is present in the codes of ethics that govern
attorneys and judges. Furthermore, the idea that attorneys have a duty to
the public that may be just as important as the duty to zealously defend
their clients’ interests gains currency within the profession every day.
Katherine Sullivan, Letting the Sunshine In: Ethical Implications of the Sunshine in
Litigation Act, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 923, 931 (2010) (describing duties that
attorneys owe to the public at large); see also Patrick T. Casey & Richard S.
Dennison, The Revision to ABA Rule 1.6 and the Conflicting Duties of the Lawyer to Both
the Client and Society, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 569, 582 (2003) (“[T]he legal
profession places great emphasis on both the attorney’s duty to the client and to
society.”). For another example of the interaction between the public interest and
professional rules, see supra notes 92–96 and accompanying text (discussing the
relationship between whistleblowing and the duty of zealous advocacy).
195. See Cavico, supra note 20, at 635 (asserting that the “general duty” of
loyalty and confidentiality “can be superseded by special circumstances,” due in
part to moral or ethical constraints).
196. Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 242–43 (Anderson, J. Paul, dissenting).
197. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
198. See Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 232–33 (Magnuson, C.J., concurring).
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Magnuson noted: “The [ABA] Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility has expressed its opinion that a lawyer
may disclose confidences in order to establish a whistleblower claim
199
against a former client.”
The concurrence subsequently
downplayed—and arguably ignored—this statement, asserting only
that it does not provide attorneys “complete freedom” to reveal
200
client confidences.
However, the lack of “complete freedom” to
disclose confidential information certainly (and logically) does not
foreclose the possibility of whistleblower protection which is
expressly permitted by ABA ethical rules. This analysis relates only
to the disclosure of confidential information in the course of
establishing a whistleblower claim, but does not directly determine
the underlying issue of whether an attorney is barred from even
bringing a claim if said attorney first breaches client confidentiality.
While this issue is not directly resolved by the ABA allowance of
attorney-whistleblower claims, the result is implied. In order to
“blow the whistle,” an attorney inherently has to breach, to some
extent, the required confidentiality. Therefore, permitting a
whistleblower claim is impliedly allowing such a claim following a
breach of client confidences. Any contrary conclusion would
negate the explicit language and intent of the ABA with respect to
authorization of attorney-whistleblower claims.
Chief Justice Magnuson’s other primary argument was that
whistleblower law should not “trump” ethical rules of the legal
201
profession.
The concurrence further explained that
whistleblower doctrines and ethical duties were both founded on
202
sound public policy principles.
This explanation is clear
evidence of conflicting policy interests. Where a conflict exists
between two or more crucial public policies, there should be no
per se rules—or, in the words of Chief Justice Magnuson, one
203
should not categorically “trump” the other.
As a supplementary
policy argument, it has been asserted that “[c]ourts declining to
extend [whistleblower protection] to attorneys on the theory that
199. Id.
200. Id. at 233. Attorney-whistleblowers lack “complete freedom” because,
according to the ABA, they can only “reveal information to the extent necessary to
establish [a] claim” and must take “reasonable affirmative steps . . . to avoid
unnecessary disclosure and limit the information revealed.” ABA Comm. on Ethics
and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 01-424 (2001).
201. See supra text accompanying notes 133, 190.
202. See supra text accompanying note 190.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 133, 190.
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[it] would undermine attorney-client confidentiality may be failing
to see the obvious. It is possible that extending [whistleblower
protection] to in-house counsel could actually encourage
corporations to conduct their affairs ethically and in accordance
204
with the law.”
A major shortcoming of Chief Justice Magnuson’s argument
for the “traditional” view of attorney-whistleblowers is that it
completely failed to acknowledge any distinction between in-house
205
counsel and outside attorneys.
The interactions between inhouse counsel and their clients cannot be characterized solely as an
attorney-client relationship, but must be viewed as an employer206
employee relationship as well.
The latter relationship is so
prevalent that “the elements of client trust and attorney autonomy
207
The employment context of inare less likely to be implicated.”
house counsel is sufficiently different to question not only whether,
in certain circumstances, a breach of confidentiality may be
permitted under ethical rules, but also whether in-house counsel
208
start with a reduced standard of confidentiality.
Consequently,

204. Lane, supra note 187, at 241. This analysis goes one step further:
[Courts] recognize[] that lawyers are governed by ethical standards
which “are . . . linked by their nature and goals to important values
affecting the public interest at large.” Accordingly, though counsel’s
claim for [whistleblower protection] may be tangentially beneficial to
counsel, it serves as the necessary encouragement to advance the
fundamental public policies inherent in an attorney’s adherence to his
ethical code as opposed to his silent conformance with illegitimate
employer demands.
Id. at 242 (quoting Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 498
(Cal. 1994)).
205. See Kidwell v. Sybaritic, Inc., 784 N.W.2d 220, 231–34 (Minn. 2010)
(Magnuson, C.J., concurring); see also supra Part III.A (discussing the unique
circumstances of an in-house counsel and how the role is distinguished from
outside attorneys).
206. Christopher G. Senior, Does New York’s Code of Professional Responsibility
Force Lawyers to Put Their Jobs on the Line? A Critical Look at Wieder v. Skala, 9
HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 417, 442–43 (1992) (discussing a prior Minnesota Supreme
Court case and quoting the court: “[T]he in-house attorney is also a company
employee, and we see no reason to deny the job security aspects of the employeremployee relationship if this can be done without violence to the integrity of the
attorney-client relationship.” (quoting Nordling v. N. States Power Co., 478
N.W.2d 498, 502 (Minn. 1991)) (alteration in original)).
207. John R. Webb & J. Chris Kinsman, Wrongful Discharge Suits by In-House
Counsel: Refining the General Dynamics Standard, 11 LAB. LAW. 35, 43 (1995)
(quoting Nordling, 478 N.W.2d at 502).
208. Sally R. Weaver, Client Confidences in Disputes Between In-House Attorneys and
Their Employer-Clients: Much Ado About Nothing—or Something?, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
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in-house counsel do not fit into the “typical” attorney-client
paradigm.
However, Chief Justice Magnuson’s concurrence
209
assumed the contrary —a supposition that resulted in an inferior
analysis and result.
D. Whistleblowers Not Barred by a Breach
Compelling public policy interests underlying whistleblower
210
protection, permission to bring whistleblower claims under ABA
211
ethical standards, and the unique circumstances of in-house
counsel make improper a categorical prohibition against
protection for attorney-whistleblowers who breach fiduciary
obligations, such as client confidences. “At a minimum . . .
attorneys should not be treated less favorably than non-attorneys in
212
similar jurisdictions for purposes of [whistleblower protection].”
Instead of treating the breach of confidentiality as a dispositive
finding of fact which determines the outcome, courts should use a
breach of confidentiality as a factor to contemplate in the greater
whistleblower claim.
VI. BALANCING TEST FOR IN-HOUSE COUNSEL
There is no question as to whether an attorney, including inhouse counsel, can be a whistleblower—at least in some instances—
and receive the attendant protections. The Kidwell plurality
explicitly stated that an employee whose job duties include
investigating and reporting wrongdoing could be a whistleblower,
thereby providing a possibility for protected conduct even within a
213
job duty analysis.
Moreover, the ABA has shown its approval of

483, 528–29 (1997) (explaining that outside lawyers may try to convince clients
that sensitive matters should be referred outside the company because of “the
possibility that in-house attorneys may not be held to the same standards of
professional conduct as outside lawyers”; noting that there may be “a problem for
in-house clients [as to] whether they are going to use in-house counsel for
anything sensitive”).
209. All of the case law cited in the Kidwell concurrence to support Chief
Justice Magnuson’s legal analysis and arguments involved outside attorneys, not inhouse counsel. Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 232–34.
210. See supra Part II.B.
211. See supra notes 198–199 and accompanying text.
212. Long, supra note 152, at 1098–99.
213. Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 228 (plurality opinion). However, the Kidwell
plurality’s possibility for protection for employees charged with such job duties is
quite narrow. It would only protect such employees if they made a report “outside
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214

protection for attorney-whistleblowers.
Therefore, the crucial
question is: under what circumstances can an in-house counsel be a
whistleblower?
A. Problems with Bright-Line Tests
Notwithstanding its purported rejection of a job duty
215
the Kidwell plurality focused its analysis almost
exception,
216
exclusively on the scope and nature of Kidwell’s job duties.
In
the Kidwell concurrence, Chief Justice Magnuson concentrated
217
entirely on Kidwell’s breach of client confidentiality.
Consequently, both the plurality and concurrence essentially
reduced the whistleblower claim—which requires a necessarily
complex set of questions—into a single inquiry (job scope and
218
fiduciary duties, respectively).
Instead, the Minnesota Supreme
Court should have employed a balancing test that took into
account all, or most, of the relevant evidence, facts, and
circumstances to determine the critical issue of good faith. Such a
test would have undoubtedly included consideration of Kidwell’s
job duties and fiduciary duties. This type of test allows for a more
nuanced analysis, especially with respect to statutory interpretation
and professional responsibility, and, in turn, better legal decisions.
When facing a statutory whistleblower claim, a court’s main
objective should be to interpret the statute and apply the law to the
219
facts in the case. As a result, a court should base its analysis in the
language, requirements, and constraints of the applicable statute.
normal channels” or outside the scope of their “normal or assigned job duties.”
Id. at 228–29. Nevertheless, the plurality recognized the possibility, albeit limited,
for attorney-whistleblowers to engage in protected conduct. Id.
214. See supra notes 205–206 and accompanying text.
215. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
216. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 130–139.
218. A whistleblower claim necessitates a complex set of questions because,
according to Minnesota Whistleblower Statute and the definition adopted for
purposes of this article, there are numerous elements relating to the purported
whistleblower’s conduct and state of mind (i.e., good faith), as well as professional
duties in the context of attorney-whistleblowers. See supra notes 24, 70–79, and
accompanying text.
219. See Mathew Paulose Jr., Note, United States v. McDougald: The Anathema
to 18 U.S.C. 1956 and National Efforts Against Money Laundering, 21 FORDHAM INT’L
L.J. 253, 301 (1997) (“The first rule of statutory interpretation is for a court to give
effect to the plain meaning of a statute’s language.”); see also MINN. STAT. §
645.08(1) (2010) (explaining that “words and phrases are construed according to
rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage”).
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Under the Minnesota Whistleblower Statute, once the basic
elements of the whistleblower claim are proven (e.g., a “report” was
made which caused an adverse employment action), the threshold
issue becomes the purported whistleblower’s state of mind—that is,
whether the report was made in good faith with the purpose of
220
exposing an illegality.
As discussed above, the analyses utilized by the Kidwell plurality
and the Kidwell concurrence both hinge on one major factor. The
plurality adopted a relatively bright-line rule to ascertain a
221
purported whistleblower’s state of mind (i.e., good faith), while
the concurrence created a categorical rule that obviates the need to
222
consider state of mind altogether.
Each approach presents a
fundamental problem. The Kidwell plurality’s reliance on job scope
and communication channels did not effectively determine good
faith. It used two potential indicators without inquiring into either
Kidwell’s subjective state of mind or what state of mind could be
reasonably (objectively) inferred given the facts. Therefore, the
plurality was unsuccessful in fully revealing Kidwell’s good faith (or
lack of good faith), and accordingly failed to properly apply the
Whistleblower Statute. On the other hand, the Kidwell concurrence
completely ignored the statutory language and circumvented the
need to discuss the threshold issue of good faith by excepting
attorneys who breach fiduciary duties (e.g., client confidentiality)
from the statute’s purview, without any statutory grounds to do
223
so.
Consequently, the concurrence also failed to properly apply
the Whistleblower Statute.

220. See Kidwell v. Sybaritic, Inc., 784 N.W.2d 220, 227 (Minn. 2010)
(identifying the issues of good faith and purpose as the “central question”); supra
notes 111, 126 and accompanying text; see also Obst v. Microtron, Inc., 614 N.W.2d
196, 202 (Minn. 2000) (requiring a good faith report made with the purpose of
exposing an illegality). The issue may be considered “threshold” to the extent that
it is, at this point in the analysis, likely the only remaining issue between a
successful claim (i.e., whistleblower protection) and an unsuccessful one.
221. See supra text accompanying note 126.
222. See supra text accompanying note 133.
223. See supra text accompanying note 196.
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B. Value of a Balancing Test
Unfortunately, presumptions and categorical rules are unfit
224
The Kidwell plurality effectively
for determining state of mind.
presumed a lack of good faith based on job duties and/or
communication channels and the concurrence created a per se bar
from whistleblower protection based on a breach of fiduciary duty.
Therefore, both opinions failed to answer the central question
regarding Kidwell’s good faith and, as a consequence, did not
properly determine the outcome in Kidwell. If the Minnesota
Supreme Court had instead applied a test whereby it balanced
numerous factors to determine Kidwell’s state of mind, it would
have reached a more appropriate conclusion—regardless of
225
whether that conclusion would have been the same or different.
A balancing test would account for the complexity of an inhouse counsel’s role in the organization, the difficulty and
ambiguity of an in-house counsel’s decision to “blow the whistle,”
and the fact-sensitive nature of whistleblower claims generally.
Also, the perverse effect of a bright-line rule regarding scope of job
duties and communication channels may be ameliorated by a
factors-based test that provides more leniency and flexibility based
on the individual circumstances of the case. Furthermore, the
main advantage of a bright-line rule is to infuse predictability into
the law in order to permit attorneys and non-attorneys alike to
conduct themselves in a manner that is consistent with the law.
Because whistleblower claims by nature are somewhat
226
unpredictable, utilizing a balancing test will not unduly reduce
the predictability (or lack thereof) in whistleblower cases.
Moreover, an in-house counsel whistleblower claim is not a

224. Ronald J. Offenkrantz, Negotiating and Drafting the Agreement to Arbitrate in
2003: Insuring Against a Failure of Professional Responsibility, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV.
271, 275 (2003) (emphasizing that when courts apply presumptions to determine
intent there is an “obvious risk that the court’s presumptions could be an
inaccurate portrayal of, or even adverse to, the parties’ original intent”); Michael
P. Van Alstine, Consensus, Dissensus, and Contractual Obligation Through the Prism of
Uniform International Sales Law, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 63 (1996) (noting the risk of
inaccuracy in determinations of intent when relying on presumptions).
225. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s failure to take into account all of the
necessary evidence to determine Kidwell’s good faith, as needed to apply the
Minnesota Whistleblower Statute, does not necessarily mean that it reached the
wrong result, but merely that its analyses were not nearly as effective or convincing
as they could have otherwise been.
226. See supra note 52.
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problem that implicates only the rights of two private parties
(where categorical rules are stronger), as an attorney owes duties
227
not only to his or her client, but to the public as well. Finally, it is
inappropriate to use bright-line or categorical rules where there are
closely competing public policy interests, such as those implicated
228
by in-house counsel whistleblower claims.
In his concurrence,
Chief Justice Magnuson made it clear that no area of law or public
policy should “trump” another with respect to an in-house counsel
229
whistleblower.
C. Balancing Factors to Determine Good Faith
Having discussed the relative value of a balancing test
generally, it is appropriate to contemplate some of the factors
which ought to be balanced. It is necessary to reiterate that these
factors should only be considered in making a determination
regarding the threshold issue of good faith. The other elements of
a whistleblower claim are more straightforward and less critical—
thus, the balancing test is just one part of the overall analysis in a
230
whistleblower case. Consideration of good faith is likely to occur
after all of the basic elements (e.g., report, adverse employment
action, and causation) have already been proven.
Conceptually, the good faith question has two distinguishable
components: 1) whether the purported whistleblower made the
report with the purpose of exposing an illegality (which is
necessary, but not sufficient, to satisfy the good faith requirement);
and 2) the broader issue of good faith (which includes, among
231
other things, the whistleblower’s purpose). However, analytically,
these two components can be contemplated at the same time and
with the same evidence because both good faith and the purpose of

227. See supra notes 92–96, 194 and accompanying text.
228. Competing policy interests include, but are not limited to, upholding the
employment-at-will doctrine, protecting private organizations’ proprietary
information, safeguarding against public harm, promoting employees to represent
the public interest (and potentially their individual morality), and sustaining the
structure and significance of the attorney-client relationship.
229. See Kidwell v. Sybaritic, Inc., 784 N.W.2d 220, 232–33 (Minn. 2010)
(Magnuson, C.J., concurring); see also supra text accompanying notes 201–203
(explaining that whistleblower law should not trump ethical rules).
230. However, the balancing test ought to be a focal point in a whistleblower
claim because state of mind is so fundamental in the character of the claim; yet, it
does not supersede or replace the overall whistleblower analysis.
231. See supra notes 111, 126, 220 and accompanying text.
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exposing an illegality are matters of state of mind—that is,
determining the whistleblower’s subjective goal in “blowing the
whistle.” They are best analyzed using a balancing test—utilizing,
among others, the factors described below—to determine whether
the purported whistleblower acted in good faith with the purpose of
232
exposing an illegality.
The factors taken into account, and their relative weight, will
likely vary on a case-by-case basis depending on the specific facts
and circumstances at issue. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify
some discrete factors among the multitude of plausible
considerations. The following table contains a non-exhaustive list
of possible factors that may contribute to a court’s finding that a
report was made in good faith with the purpose of exposing an
illegality

Employee’s job duties

To whom the report
was provided

Factors militating in
favor of a report made
in good faith with the
purpose of exposing
an illegality
Report itself was
outside the normal
scope of job
responsibilities;
manner in which
report was
investigated, created,
or communicated was
not ordinary or
routine; report was a
one-time task or event
Outside normal
channels of
communication;
outside normal chain
of command; reported
to more and/or different
superiors than
ordinary matter

Factors militating in
favor of a report NOT
made in good faith
with the purpose of
exposing an illegality
Report itself was within
the scope of job
responsibilities;
manner in which
report was
investigated, created,
or communicated was
normal and ordinary;
report was a
continuous or
recurring task
Within the normal
channels of
communication; inside
the normal chain of
command; reported to
the same superiors as
ordinary matters

232. Abstractly speaking, the standard “in good faith with the purpose of
exposing an illegality” would answer the question posed in the first paragraph of
Part VI: Under what circumstances can an in-house counsel be a whistleblower?
Practically speaking, however, the actual circumstances would be determined by
employing the balancing test and factors described in this Part.
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Content of the report

Clearly implicated a
violation of law

Timing of the report

Timing was of no
particular
consequence

Impetus for “blowing
the whistle”

Motivation based on
individual morality,
service to the public
good, innate sense of
fairness, or any other
motive that does not
directly benefit the
whistleblower
More egregious illegal
activities may
necessitate greater
flexibility or leniency
for the whistleblower
because the public’s
interest in stopping or
preventing such
conduct increases
If it is unlikely other
employees knew of the
illegality or were
unlikely to report the
illegality, it may
necessitate greater
flexibility or leniency
for the whistleblower
because of his or her
unique position
Moderate to
significant efforts by
the whistleblower to
internally avert,
mitigate, or otherwise
prevent any harm
resulting from illegal
activity (before and/or

Egregiousness of
alleged illegality

Likelihood another
employee would have
“blown the whistle”

Extent to which
whistleblower
attempted to remedy
the situation prior to
his or her termination
(or other
discrimination)
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Alluded to, but did not
expressly implicate, a
violation of law or
discussed only a
potential illegality
Timing itself caused a
material benefit to the
whistleblower or a
substantial detriment
to the organization
Ulterior motivation
highly plausible (e.g.,
threatening
management,
negotiating buyout)

Less egregious illegal
activities may not merit
any flexibility or
leniency for the
whistleblower, and
may indicate an
ulterior motivation or
bad faith by the
whistleblower
If it is likely that other
employees knew of the
illegality or were likely
to report the illegality,
it may not merit any
flexibility or leniency
for the whistleblower
because he or she was
not in a particularly
unique position
Little or no effort to
remedy the illegality
internally before
“blowing the whistle”
(internally or
externally)
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Amount and/or
accuracy of evidence
or knowledge the
whistleblower
possessed
Breach of fiduciary
duty (i.e., client
confidentiality)
Extent and effect of
any breach of fiduciary
duty

after conduct became
illegal)
Actual knowledge of
illegality and/or
substantial evidence
proving the existence
of illegal conduct
Disclosure or manner
of disclosure did not
violate any fiduciary
duties to the client
Minor breach with
respect to the amount
or magnitude of
information disclosed;
little or no resulting
harm to the client

[Vol. 37:4

Mere speculation or
conjecture based on
minimal objective
evidence (e.g., based
on rumor or thirdparty reports)
Disclosure or manner
of disclosure violated
fiduciary duties to the
client
Major breach with
respect to the amount
or magnitude of
information disclosed;
moderate to
significant harm to the
client

Under this balancing framework, both the job duties and
breach of fiduciary duty analyses—which the Kidwell plurality and
concurrence relied on, respectively—would be subsumed into a
broader analysis of good faith, where neither factor would be
dispositive or unduly determinative. The more comprehensive
analysis can more appropriately determine the purported
whistleblower’s state of mind—a threshold issue—and therefore
can more accurately interpret and apply the language of the
Minnesota Whistleblower Statute.
D. Application of the Balancing Test
1.

Applying the Test in Kidwell

Kidwell’s claim satisfied all of the basic elements required for
whistleblower protection.
The email certainly constituted a
“report,” Kidwell was terminated (an adverse action), and the jury
233
decided there was a casual connection between the two events.
Therefore, as the plurality noted, the fundamental issue in Kidwell
was whether Kidwell acted in good faith with the purpose of

233.

Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 220, 225.
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234

exposing an illegality. At this point, it is necessary to employ the
balancing test to determine the critical state of mind issues, and
ultimately the appropriate outcome in the case.
There are good arguments that Kidwell’s report was made as
part of his job duties—namely, that he was charged with providing
235
advice on any or all legal matters. But there is a legitimate retort
that it was outside his job duties—reporting the noncompliance
with discovery orders was a duty of the outside counsel, which
236
Kidwell voluntarily assumed.
Sybaritic would also argue that
Kidwell made the report within the normal channels of
communication and inside the ordinary chain of command as he
sent the Difficult Duty email to most of the management team, with
whom Kidwell worked closely. However, Kidwell would point out
that he had never before notified the entire management team
about any legal issue, but rather typically communicated with one
237
or two individuals. Therefore, the report was outside the normal
channels of communication and chain of command. Sybaritic may
assert that the Difficult Duty email did not implicate a violation of
law as its main goal was to alert the management of the “pervasive
238
culture of dishonesty.” However, this particular argument will fail
because, while the whole email did not implicate violations of law,
several specific allegations of illegality were contained in the email.
There was no issue regarding the timing of the Difficult Duty email
nor was there any evidence of an ulterior motive besides Kidwell’s
239
desire to comply with his moral and professional obligations.
While Sybaritic’s alleged illegalities caused no resounding
harm to the public, false allegations in pleadings, noncompliance
with discovery orders, and charges of obstruction of justice can
hardly be considered “minor” offenses. Moreover, Kidwell learned
of these violations in his position as in-house counsel, so it is
unlikely any other employees would have a sufficient basis to “blow
240
the whistle.”
Therefore, Kidwell was in a unique position

234. Id. at 227.
235. See id. at 221.
236. Id. at 241–42 (Anderson, J. Paul, dissenting).
237. Id. at 223 (plurality opinion).
238. Id. at 240 (Anderson, J. Paul, dissenting).
239. See id. at 221–22 (plurality opinion) (noting Kidwell’s “deep regret” for
having to write the email in accordance with his personal and professional duties).
240. Although unlikely, Sybaritic could conceivably argue the outside counsel
knew, or suspected, the illegality. Id. at 241 (Anderson, J. Paul, dissenting).
However, if this argument was raised, it would fail because the outside counsel
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amongst his fellow employees. Although Kidwell threatened to
alert the “appropriate authorities” of the illegalities, it was clear
that he was attempting to remedy the problem internally as he first
sent the Difficult Duty email to the management team (before
disclosing the illegalities to the authorities) and met with the
management to establish an action plan to resolve the legal
241
problems.
Furthermore, Kidwell had strong evidence of the
illegality and it was based on his personal knowledge and
interactions within his position as in-house counsel. Finally,
Kidwell did, in fact, breach his fiduciary duty to Sybaritic; however,
242
the jury determined that no damages were caused by the breach.
Upon considering the aforementioned factors, the court
should have found that Kidwell possessed the proper state of mind
to receive whistleblower protection—that is to say, Kidwell made
the report in good faith with the purpose of exposing an illegality.
The arguments relating to job duties and communication channels
were roughly equal on both sides, or, at least, neither materially
outweighed the other. The breach of fiduciary duty, although not
causing any damage, militates in favor of a lack of good faith due to
the seriousness of any such breach. However, almost all of the
remaining factors weigh heavily in favor of a finding of good faith.
Because the purpose of the balancing test is to take into account
the specific facts and totality of the circumstances (although, not
necessarily with equal weight), it is evident that under such an
approach Kidwell would have been deemed to have acted with the
requisite state of mind. Since his good faith was the sole remaining
issue in the case, Kidwell would have succeeded in his overall claim
and been afforded protection under the Minnesota Whistleblower
Statute.
2.

In-House Counsel, Generally

While the goal of the balancing test is to account for a wide
variety of highly diverse sets of facts, there are some generalizations
that can be made as to the applicability of whistleblower
protections in the context of in-house counsel. When applied to

could not be a whistleblower because he or she was not an employee, so that
knowledge does not impact the factor relating to the likelihood of another
whistleblower within the organization.
241. Id. at 223.
242. Id. at 225.
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in-house counsel, the balancing test will generally produce a
smaller subset of whistleblowers than the definition provided for
243
purposes of this article.
That is to say, the circumstances under
which an in-house counsel will likely have the requisite state of
mind (i.e., good faith) to satisfy a whistleblower statute is narrower
than the group of individuals that would otherwise fall into the
category labeled “whistleblowers” for general purposes in this
article.
Typically, an in-house counsel would need to “blow the
whistle” internally—at least initially. If terminated upon an
internal report or upon a later external report, the in-house
244
counsel may be eligible for whistleblower protection.
This
probable requirement recognizes the importance of the attorneyclient relationship, and client confidentiality more specifically.
This process would permit an in-house counsel to first look after
the client’s interests while fulfilling his or her professional duties,
and then serve the public interest if, or when, any alleged
illegalities fail to be rectified. Furthermore, an in-house counsel
would likely fail to receive protection if he or she “blew the whistle”
and disclosed client confidences to the media because that would
be an egregious breach of confidentiality likely to result in
significant undue harm to the client. Therefore, an in-house
counsel would ultimately have to inform a relevant governmental
245
actor if the legal problems persisted.
Generally, the allegations of wrongdoing would have to be a
violation of law. Permitting an in-house counsel to breach his or
her fiduciary duties to the client (without giving up whistleblower
protection) for anything less than a violation of law (e.g., merely
“immoral conduct”) would disproportionately favor the public’s
interest in preventing the specific harm, as compared to the
public’s interest in maintaining a strong attorney-client
relationship. Since an in-house counsel is a trained attorney, he or

243. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
244. The obvious issue is how long an in-house counsel must wait after an
internal report before he or she could justifiably “blow the whistle” externally and
still maintain whistleblower protections. The period of time would likely be that
which is reasonable under the circumstances. Beyond that likely standard, it
would be a factual question.
245. However, an in-house counsel would likely lose any whistleblower
protection if he or she informed a governmental actor of illegality before “blowing
the whistle” inside his or her own organization or taking any other steps to remedy
known or suspected violations of law.
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she may be likely to be held to a slightly higher standard of
knowledge of the law. In effect, good faith may not mean merely
246
making a good faith report of the facts, but also a good faith
effort to ascertain the applicability and avert the consequences of
any alleged illegalities. Finally, like all whistleblowers, an in-house
counsel must intend to make known or expose the violation of law.
Notwithstanding the aforementioned generalities, courts would
apply the balancing test and contemplate the impact of all of the
factors to determine the critical issue of good faith. No single
factor would be either determinative as to the protection afforded
or a categorical bar to protection. The previously discussed
generalizations oversimplify the considerations, but provide a sense
of “weight” that may be attributed to certain particularly germane
factors.
VII. CONCLUSION
Whistleblower statutes, and whistleblower law more generally,
are intended to promote legal compliance, thus benefiting the
public interest by providing protection for employees that risk their
247
reputation and livelihoods to “blow the whistle.”
However, this
public policy goal is complicated by the unique circumstances and
concerns of in-house counsel who operate within a “good cop, bad
cop” dichotomy that exists in the nature of their roles within their
248
organizations.
An internally divisive paradigm exists not only in
relation to an in-house counsel’s company, but also with respect to
249
an attorney’s duty to the public at large.
That is to say, conduct
that may be beneficial to an individual in-house counsel (e.g.,
keeping one’s job) may be detrimental to society (e.g., permitting
perpetuation of public harms by failing to “blow the whistle”), with

246. Cf. supra note 79 and accompanying text (explaining that in a nonattorney whistleblower case, “good faith” may not require that the facts be entirely
accurate, but rather that the purported whistleblower—knowing the appropriate
law—thought the facts constituted a violation of law and made a good faith report).
Once again, the standard may be one of reasonableness—likely, the knowledge
and prudence of a reasonable attorney under the circumstances. Therefore, if
under this standard, an in-house counsel was simply wrong about the law or failed
to appropriately apply the law to the facts, he or she would not be likely to satisfy
the “elevated good faith” requirement, and consequently would not obtain
whistleblower protection.
247. See supra Part II.
248. See supra Parts I, III.A.
249. See supra notes 92–96, 194 and accompanying text.
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the converse likely being true as well. Kidwell illustrated the
difficult decisions made by in-house attorneys, and the equally
difficult judgments required by courts interpreting whistleblower
250
statutes as they relate to in-house counsel.
By analyzing the legal reasoning and policy arguments, it
becomes clear that the job duty exception to whistleblower statutes
is unwarranted and unnecessary as other methods exist to better
251
determine valid claims without the negative policy implications.
Furthermore, breach of client confidentiality should not result in a
categorical bar to attorney-whistleblower claims because a proper
analysis would show due respect and deference to conflicting
252
public policy judgments and appropriate statutory interpretation.
Issues relating to both job duties and breach of client confidences
ought to be decided as part of a more comprehensive balancing, or
factor-based, test used to determine the state of mind of in-house
253
attorney-whistleblowers.
Flexible, fact-sensitive inquiries are far
more appropriate than categorical rules due to the complexity of
the considerations and practical implications for in-house counsel
faced with a potential decision to “blow the whistle.” The
application of a balancing test would assist in thorough statutory
interpretation by more accurately determining good faith, thereby
producing superior legal and practical outcomes.

250.
251.
252.
253.

See supra Part III.B–C.
See supra Part IV.
See supra Part V.
See supra Part VI.
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